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64th  Congress  \  SFNATE  (Document 

1st  Session      J  \    No.  32;J 


PREPARATIONS  FOR  PEACE 


AN  ADDRESS 


DELIVERED  ON  THE  OCCASION  OF  THE  NINETY-SEVENTH 

CONVOCATION  OF  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO 

DECEMBER  21,    1915,   AND  BEFORE  THE 

INDUSTRIAL  CLUB  OF  CHfCAGO 

ON  JANUARY  27,    1916 


BY 

HON.  WALTER  L.   FISHER 

FORMER  SECRETARY  OF  THE  INTERIOR 

SOUTHERN  BRANCH, 

UNIVERSITY'  OF  CALIFORNIA, 
LIBRARY, 

tf-OS  ANGELES,  CALIF. 


PRESENTED  BY  MR.  LA  FOLLETTE 

FEiiHUARY  14,  1916.— Ordered  to  be  printed 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 

1U16 


5") 
9 


PREPARATIONS  FOR  PEACE.1 

Walter  L.  Fisheb,  former  Secretary  of  the  Interior. 

Half  truths  are  dangerous  because  the  element  of  truth  which 
they  contain  carries  conviction  and  easily  leads  to  its  application  far 
beyond  the  real  significance  to  which  it  is  entitled.  We  are  at 
present  in  grave  danger  of  just  such  a  misconception  of  one  of  the 
most  prevalent  statements  with  regard  to  military  preparation.  The 
sentiment  of  this  country  is  undoubtedly  opposed  to  militarism. 
Our  ideals  and  purposes  are  peaceful.  No  imperialistic  propaganda 
could  hope  to  succeed  if  its  character  and  purposes  were  understood. 
The  agitation  for  increasing  our  military  forces  is  as  a  Avhole 
genuinely  peaceful  in  its  purpose.  Certainly  it  makes  its  great  ap- 
peal upon  the  ground  that  preparation  for  war  is  essential  for  the 
preservation  of  peace.  The  proverbs  of  the  ancients  and  the  utter- 
ances of  our  early  Presidents  are  the  mottoes  it  repeats:  Si  vis  pa<<  m 
para  bellum,  "  If  you  wish  peace  prepare  for  war." 

And  undoubtedly  in  a  world  where  selfishness  and  greed  and  lust 
of  power  still  move  the  mass  and  the  rulers  of  men  to  the  extent 
they  do  to-day,  where  force  is  still  believed  to  constitute  a  necessary 
if  not  a  proper  means  of  advancing  national  interests  and  national 
ideals,  military  preparation  against  war  is  an  essential  for  securing 
peace.  But  there  is  real  danger  that  we  shall  be  misled — or  may 
deceive  ourselves — into  believing  that  preparation  for  war  is  the 
most  important  thing  for  us  if  we  desire  to  secure  our  own  peace 
and  to  promote  the  peace  of  the  world.  Nothing,  it  seems  to  me, 
could  be  more  unfortunate  than  such  a  result.  If  we  wish  peace,  the 
most  important  thing  is  not  to  prepare  for  war — although  that  we 
should  do.  If  we  wish  peace,  the  most  important — the  all-impor- 
tant— thing  is  to  prepare  for  peace;  to  do  the  things  that  make  for 
peace  and  that  promote  peace,  not  the  things  that  make  for  war  and 
promote  war.  And  yet  these  peaceful  measures  are  the  things  that 
are  receiving  scant  attention. 

I  am  led  to  present  to  you  some  thoughts  upon  this  subject  because 
the  significance  of  the  great  war  in  which  the  larger  part  of  the 
civilized  world  is  now  engaged  is  the  one  absorbing  interest  of  our 
whole  intellectual  life.  1  have  no  thought  that  I  shall  say  things 
that  have  not  been  better  said  by  others — that  I  have  anything 
original  to  impart.  I  am  moved  by  a  deep  conviction  that  mankind 
is  struggling  with  destiny  as  it  has  seldom  struggled  before,  and  that 
it  is  the  duty  of  every  man  and  woman — and  especially  of  every 
educated  man  and  woman — to  think  of  this  world  war,  its  causes, 
and  its  probable  results;  and,  as  his  thoughts  become  at  all  definite, 
to  express  them,  if  it  be  only  in  confirmation  of,  or  dissent  from,  the 

'Delivered  (in  parti  as  an  address  on  the  occasion  of  Hie  Ninety-seventh  Convocation 
of  the  University  of  Chicago  held  in  I.eon  Mandel  Assembly  Hall,  December  21,  1915. 
Delivered  on  January  27,  lUlO,  before  the  Industrial  Club  of  Chicago. 

3 


^: 


^  451645 


4  PREPARATIONS    FOR    PEACE. 

views  expressed  by  others  which  are  likely  to  affect  public  opinion 
and  public  action.  It  is  a  time  for  each  human  being,  in  humility 
and  sincerity,  to  ask  himself:  "What  do  I  think?  What  is  the  ex- 
planation of  this  appalling  catastrophe  and  what  is  to  follow  it? 
What  should  and  what  can  I,  in  my  tin}'  circle  of  possible  action,  do 
to  help,  if  ever  so  little,  toward  a  right  solution  of  the  problems  it 
presents  ?  " 

What  might  be  called  its  purely  academic  interest  is  greater  than 
any  other  interest  of  the  student.  It  pervades  the  library  and  the 
laboratory,  the  classroom  and  the  lecture  hall,  and  the  quiet  cloisters 
of  the  university.  What  a  compelling  stimulus  to  intellectual  activity 
it  is;  what  a  zest  it  adds  to  all  our  studies  in  physical,  political,  social, 
and  economic  science:  to  what  fierce  tests  it  is  subjecting  our  theories 
of  human  progress  and  social  evolution! 

There  is  nothing,  indeed,  so  instructive,  so  absorbing,  so  essential 
for  us — as  individuals  and  as  a  nation — to  understand  as  the  mighty 
conflict  that  is  now  going  en;  its  causes  and  its  consequences,  its 
horrors  and  its  folly.  It  is  important  for  all  of  us  to  appreciate  the 
reality  of  its  horror.  But  I  am  not  qualified  to  picture  this  horror  if 
I  would,  and  this  is  not  the  place  or  the  occasion.  It  is  fitting,  how- 
ever, for  us  to  consider  its  folly,  and  how  we  in  the  future  may 
escape  such  folly.  "Wisdom  is  the  principal  thing;  therefore  get 
wisdom:  and  with  all  thy  getting  get  understanding." 

There  is  a  call  for  the  public  service  of  educated  men  and  women 
such  as  has  not  been  heard  in  the  world  since  the  French  Revolution. 
For  we  must  go  back  to  France  and  the  Napoleonic  era  for  any  such 
epochal  events  as  are  happening  in  the  world  to-day.  It  is  quite  pos- 
sible, perhaps  it  is  exceedingly  probable,  that  the  actual  consequences 
upon  our  whole  intellectual,  social,  political,  and  economic  outlook 
that  will  follow  and  result  from  this  war  will  be  greater  than  those 
that  followed  even  that  great  upheaval  of  civilized  society.  It  is 
only  as  we  understand  how  fundamental  are  the  issues  that  are  forced 
upon  us  that  we  shall  meet  those  issues  intelligently  and  wisely.  Our 
clanger,  and  the  danger  of  Europe,  is  that  we  shall  see  its  causes  and 
effects  superficially  and  shall  devise  superficial  remedies  and  adopt  a 
superficial  settlement.  There  are  so  many  essentially  superficial 
phases  of  the  situation  that  are  nevertheless  so  important  and  so  com- 
pelling in  their  interest  that  we  can  all  be  forgiven  for  misconceiving 
their  relative  importance  compared  with  the  deeper  issues;  but  it 
is  only  as  we  find  and  face  these  deeper  issues  of  transcendent  conse- 
quence that  we  shall  work  good  out  of  this  awful  evil  that  has  fallen 
on  mankind. 

Already  the  danger  of  one  great  folly  from  a  superficial  view  of 
this  war  has  become  apparent,  and  that  is  that  we  shall  think  of  it  as 
due  to  and  as  an  exhibition  of  ruthless  military  power;  that  it  is  due 
to  what  is  called  Prussianism,  and  that  if  we  could  just  curb  and 
destroy  Prussianism  the  world  could  go  on  quite  satisfactorily,  upon 
the  whole,  and  without  any  serious  or  fundamental  disturbance  of  the 
established  social,  political,  economic,  and  intellectual  order.  No 
mistake  could  be  made  so  disastrous  to  the  future  peace  and  progress 
of  mankind  as  this.  Even  if  the  Prussian  war  god  sits  the  saddle  in 
Germany  to-day,  waging  war  with  a  ruthlessness  that  appalls  man- 
kind and  an  efliciency  that  compels  its  admiration,  nevertheless,  how 


PREPARATIONS   FOR   PEACE.  5 

pitiful  would  be  the  conclusion  that  what  appalls  us  is  not  war,  but 
merely  the  ruthlessness  and  efficiency  with  which  it  is  made. 

It  was  an  American  thinking  of  war  in  America  who  said  that 
"War  is  hell!" — not  German  war  or  English  war  or  Russian  war, 
but  war,  wherever  waged  or  by  whatever  nation.  There  was  never 
a  great  war  waged  that  did  not  produce  all  the  atrocities  of  this  war, 
on  one  side  or  on  both.  The  scale  of  the  atrocities  may  be  greater,  as 
the  scale  of  this  war  is  greater.  Even  the  doctrine  of  f rightfulness  is 
a  doctrine  that  has  been  defended  and  practiced  by  every  nation,  even 
our  own,  within  such  limits  and  under  such  conditions  as  each  nation 
has  determined  for  itself  at  the  time  and  according  to  its  exigency 
as  it  saw  it.  There  are  few  follies  equal  to  the  folly  of  imagining 
that  war  can  be  made  humane. 

Our  own  "  Instructions  for  the  government  of  armies  of  the  United 
States  in  the  field"  (General  Orders,  No.  100,  18G3),  issued  under 
Abraham  Lincoln,  the  most  humane  of  Presidents,  and  again  issued 
without  modification  during  the  War  with  Spain  in  1898, announced: 

To  save  the  country  is  paramount  to  all  other  considerations. 

And — 

18.  When  the  commander  of  a  besieged  place  expels  the  noncombatants  in 
order  to  lessen  the  number  of  those  who  consume  his  stock  of  provisions,  it  is 
lawful,  though  an  extreme  measure,  to  drive  them  hack,  so  as  to  hasten  on  the 
surrender. 

19.  Commanders,  whenever  admissible,  should  inform  the  enemy  of  their 
intention  to  bombard  a  place,  so  that  the  noncombatants,  and  especially  the 
women  and  children,  may  be  removed  before  the  bombardment  commences. 
P>ut  it  is  no  infraction  of  the  common  law  of  war  to  omit  thus  to  inform  the 
enemy.    Surprise  may  be  a  necessity. 

No  matter  how  clear  the  evidence  may  seem  to  some  of  us  to-day, 
we  are  too  near  the  event  to  be  sure  of  our  perspective.  We  must  not 
forget  how  often  "  knowledge  comes,  but  wisdom  lingers."  Even  if 
we  make  certain  that  Servia  was  the  occasion,  not  the  cause,  of  this 
war:  that  Germany  had  prepared  for  "the  day"  and  that  she  chose 
the  day  which  she  thought  was  most  favorable  to  her;  that  she,  and 
no  other,  precipitated  this  horrible  cataclysm  of  cruelty  and  destruc- 
tion— even  if  we  spare  whatever  nation  is  responsible,  no  part  of  the 
just  condemnation  of  mankind  for  touching  the  match  to  the  powder 
that  had  been  so  assiduously  laid  throughout  Europe  and  that  needed 
only  the  match — how  blind,  how  pitifully  and  perversely  blind,  we 
should  be  not  to  recognize  that  the  fundamental  error  consisted  in 
having  a  state  of  international  relations  that  was  prepared  for  the 
match ;  that  the  fundamental  responsibility,  deeper  than  Prussian- 
ism,  was  with  the  nations  that  built  and  maintained  their  civiliza- 
tions over  a  powder  magazine  !  Without  now  discussing  whether  any 
other  basis  of  internationalism  is  practicable  than  the  basis  of  na- 
tional armament  and  of  military  force,  how  foolish,  how  unfair,  to 
say  that  in  a  society  of  nations  based  on  force  that  nation  which 
acquires  and  uses  the  greatest  and  the  most  efficient  force  is  exclu- 
sively to  blame  for  an  explosion  that  leads  to  a  test  of  force !  The 
matured  and  distant  judgment  of  mankind  will  be  little  concerned 
with  awarding  praise  or  blame  on  the  basis  of  the  relative  extent  or 
officiency  of  military  preparation,  or  even  of  the  relative  ruthlessness 
with  which  military  force  was  used  in  a  state  of  society  based  on 


6  PREPARATIONS   FOR   PEACE. 

force  and  on  the  use  of  force  to  secure  or  to  retain  the  right  to  exploit 
other  lands  and  peoples. 

The  truth  is  that  the  really  great  differences  between  the  warring 
nations  are  only  differences  of  degree — degrees  of  militarism,  degrees 
of  democracy,  degrees  of  political  and  economic  intelligence.  I  do 
not  minimize  these  differences.  So  gigantic  is  the  scale  on  which  the 
world  movement  proceeds  that  these  differences  of  degree  become 
of  huge  dimensions  and  importance  when  the  diverging  lines  are 
projected  into  the  expanded  field  of  action.  In  war,  international 
differences  are  centrifugal.  Chasms  widen  as  the  circumference  of 
the  conflict  expands  and  the  conflict  becomes  more  intense.  War 
distorts  and  exaggerates  and  intensifies  every  difference  of  national 
feeling,  every  national  misunderstanding.  If,  however,  it  be  true 
that  Germany  is  more  militaristic  than  England  or  France  or  Russia 
or  Italy,  it  is  true  only  as  a  statement  of  the  degree  in  which  each  of 
these  nations  has  been  and  is  militaristic.  If  it  be  true  that  Germany 
believes  that  she  has  a  national  ideal  and  peculiar  national  interests — 
political,  economic,  intellectual — which  can  be  advanced  by  military 
force,  the  same  thing  is  true  of  each  of  her  rivals.  If  it  be  true  that 
militarism  in  Germany  is  a  menace  to  the  world,  it  is  also  true  that 
militarism  in  the  rest  of  Europe  is  a  menace  to  the  world.  Does  Ger- 
many believe  that  she  has  a  peculiar  mission  to  perform  in  the  un- 
folding of  civilization,  that  her  form  of  political  organization,  her 
economic  and  intellectual  processes,  offer  the  greatest  assurance  of 
human  progress,  and  that  it  is  her  duty  as  well  as  her  right  to  impose 
this  kultur  on  the  world?  England  has  been  obsessed  by  the  same 
megalomaniac  folly.  So  have  we.  If,  happily,  we  are  less  sure  that 
we  are  the  people,  and  that  wisdom  is  in  danger  lest  it  elie  with  us, 
can  we  claim  anything  more  than  that  we  have  seen  the  futility  of 
such  egotism,  ever  so  little  sooner  and  ever  so  little  more  clearly  than 
some  others?  Are  John  Bull  and  Brother  Jonathan  types  of  modest 
self-effacement  and  humility  before  the  slowhr  unfolding  secrets  of 
the  universe? 

We  have  been  reading  much  of  the  lords  and  prophets  of  war  in 
Germany:  but  have  they  uttered  anything  more  frankly  militaristic 
than  Lord  Roberts,  "  Little  Bobs,"  the  military  idol  of  Great  Britain  3 

How  was  lliis  Empire  of  Britain  founded?  War  founded  this  Empire — war 
and  conquest!  When  wo,  therefore,  masters  by  war  of  one-third  of  the  habit- 
able globe,  when  vc  propose  to  Germany  to  disarm,  to  curtail  her  navy  or 
diminish  her  army,  Germany  naturally  refuses;  and  pointing  not  without 
justice  t<>  the  road  by  Which  England,  sword  in  hand,  has  (limbed  to  her  un- 
matched eminence,  declares  openly  or  in  the  veiled  language  of  diplomacy,  that 
by  the  same  path,  if  by  no  other.  Germany  is  determined  also  to  ascend!  Who 
amongst  us,  knowing  the  past  of  this  nation,  and  the  past  of  all  nations  and  cil  les 
that  have  ever  added  the  luster  of  their  name  to  human  annals,  can  accuse  Ger- 
many or  regard  the  utterance  of  one  of  her  greatest  a  year  and  a  half  ago  [or 
of  General  Bernhardl  three  months  ago]  with  any  feelings  except  those  of 
respect? 

Norman  Angell,  in  his  recent  book  on  America  and  the  New 
World  State,  lias  collected  this  and  many  other  quotations  which 
demonstrate  that  there  is  an  "  Anglo-Saxon  Prussianism "  which 
differs  only  from  German  Prussianism  in  the  extent  to  which  it  has 
attained  popular  support  or  official  power.  And  yet  it  was  the  bitter 
complaint  of  Bernhardi  and  Trietschke  that  their  ieleas  had  so  little 
influence  among  the  people  or  in  oflicial  circles.    The  most  interesting 


PREPARATIONS    FOR   PEACE.  7 

to  me  of  all  AngelTs  quotations  is  that  from  the  Belgian  author, 
Doctor  Sarolea,  who,  in  his  book  on  The  Anglo-German  Problem, 
says: 

What  is  even  more  serious  and  ominous,  so  far  ns  the  prospects  of  pence  are 
concerned,  the  German  who  knows  that  he  is  right  from  his  own  point  of  view, 
knows  that  lie  is  also  light  from  (lie  English  point  of  view;  he  knows  that  the 
premises  on  which  he  i.s  reasoning  are  still  accepted  by  a  large  section  of  the 
English  people.  Millions  of  English  people  are  actuated  in  their  policy  by 
those  very  imperialistic  principles  on  which  the  Germans  take  their  stand. 
After  all  German  statesmen  are  only  applying  the  political  lessons  which  Eng- 
land has  taught  them,  which  Mr.  Uudyard  Kipling  has  sung,  and  Mr.  Chamber- 
lain has  proclaimed  in  speeches  innumerable.  Both  the  English  Imperialist  and 
the  German  Imperialist  believe  that  the  greatness  of  a  country  does  not  depend 
mainly  on  the  virtues  of  the  people,  or  on  the  resources  of  the  home  country, 
but  largely  on  the  capacity  of  the  home  country  to  acquire  and  to  retain  large 
tracts  of  territory  all  over  the  world.  Both  the  English  Imperialist  and  tha 
German  Imperialist  have  learned  the  doctrine  of  Admiral  Malum,  that  the 
greatness  and  prosperity  of  a  country  depend  mainly  on  sea  power.  Both 
believe  that  efficiency  and  success  in  war  is  one  of  the  main  conditions  of 
national  prosperity. 

Now  as  long  as  the  two  nations  do  not  rise  to  a  saner  political  ideal,  ns  long 
as  both  English  and  German  people  are  agreed  in  accepting  the  current  political 
philosophy,  ns  long  ns  both  nations  shall  consider  military  power  not  merely  ns 
a  necessary  and  temporary  evil  to  submit  to,  hut  as  a  permanent  and  noble 
ideal  to  strive  after,  the  German  argument  remains  unanswerable.  War  is 
indeed  predestined,  and  no  diplomatists  sitting  round  a  great  table  in  the 
Wilhelmstrasse  or  the  Ballplatz  or  the  Qual  d'Orsay  will  be  able  to  ward  off  the 
inevitable.  It  is  only,  therefore,  in  so  far  as  both  nations  will  move  away  from 
the  old  political  philosophy  that  nn  understanding  between  Germany  and 
England  will  become  possible.  *  *  *  It  is  the  ideas  and  the  ideals  that 
must  be  fundamentally  changed:  "  Instaiiratio  facienda  ah  imis  fundainentis." 
And  those  ideals  once  changed,  all  motives  for  a  war  between  England  and  Ger- 
many would  vanish  ns  by  magic.  But  alas!  idens  and  ideals  do  not  change  by 
magic  or  prestige — they  can  only  change  by  the  slow  operation  of  intellectual 
conversion.    Arguments  alone  can  do  it. 

Let  ns  turn  from  the  war  lords  of  England  and  Germany  to  those 
who  do  not  speak  under  the  influence  of  military  training  or  military 
occupation.  We  are  told  by  the  translator  of  Dr.  Paul  Kohrbach'g 
book,  The  German  Idea  in  the  World,  that  it — 

probably  inspired  more  Germans  than  any  other  book  published  since  1871,  for 
everybody  felt  that  it  presented  a  generally  true  picture  of  the  Fatherland 
and  indicated  the  paths  which  the  Germans  had  resolved  to  follow. 

This  opinion  I  have  had  substantially  confirmed  by  most  compe- 
tent authority.  I  think  it  gives  us  a  real  insight  into  the  ideas  that 
have  moved  the  German  people.  You  will  note  that  the  author  does 
not  hesitate  to  praise  the  Anglo-Saxon  or  to  criticize  the  German, 
and  that  his  underlying  and  dominating  purpose  is  peaceful  ex- 
pansion. 

The  markets  of  the  world!  We  need  them  to-day  for  our  existence  ns  posi- 
tively as  wo  need  our  own  land,  and  the  day  is  approaching  with  irrevocable 
certainty  when  we  shall  need  them  even  more.  We  can  he  nationally  healthy 
only  so  long  as  our  share  in  the  business  of  the  world  continues  to  grow, 
and  only  if  this  is  the  case  shall  we  be  able  to  foster  the  inner  values  which 
Spring  from  our  national  idea,  and  let  them  take  part  with  the  other  factors 
in  the  shnning  of  the  culture  of  the  world.     *     *     * 

The  German  Idea,  therefore,  can  only  live  and  increase  if  its  material  founda- 
tions, viz.  the  number  of  Germans,  the  prosperity  of  Germany,  and  the  number 
and  size  of  our  world  interests  continue  to  increase.  As  these  foundations 
continue  to  grow  they  compel  the  Anglo-Saxons  to  make  their  decisiuti  between 
the  following  two  propositions: 


8  PREPARATIONS   FOR   PEACE. 

Will  they  reconcile  themselves  to  seeing  our  interests  in  the  world  maintain 
themselves  by  the  side  of  their  own  and  come  to  an  agreement  with  us  con- 
cerning them?  Or  v.  ill  they  fight,  with  force  of  arms,  to  remain  the  sole  mis- 
tress of  the  world?  If  they  choose  the  latter,  it  will  depend  on  our  strength 
whether  we  conquer  or  surrender  or  hold  our  own.     *     *     * 

We  have  progressed  within  a  generation  with  a  rapidity  which  creates  the 
belief  that  we  can  wipe  out  within  a  decade  the  losses  of  a  century.  But  we 
grow  dizzy  when  we  contemplate  our  political  economy  shooting  up  to  steep 
heights  and  resting  only  on  the  small  support  of  European  Germany,  especially 
when  we  compare  it  with  the  much  wider  security  across  oceans  and  continents 
which  England  and  America  have  built.  It  is  here  where  the  abyss  is  lurking 
into  which  our  new  grandeur  may  be  hurled  unless  we  secure  it  with  stronger 
props  than  are  made  of  iron  or  gold.  We  have  now  reached  the  point  which 
illustrates  a  fact  which  no  one  can  view  too  seriously,  namely,  that  the  world 
power  of  the  Anglo-Saxons  does  not  rest  solely  on  external  support,  such  as 
wealth,  colonies,  dominion  over  the  seas  and  flourishing  industries,  but  that 
corresponding  to  these  material  possessions  a  growth  of  character  and  of 
inner  worth  and  an  increase  in  the  breadth  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  idea  have 
actually  justified  the  people  possessing  them  in  reaching  out  for  the  dominion 
of  the  world.     *     *     * 

The  true  attitude  of  England  toward  our  navy  and  commerce  is  revealed  by 
such  comments  as  were  contained  in  the  famous  article  in  the  Saturday  Review 
of  September,  1S97,  which  made  a  great  stir  in  England  and  the  whole  world, 
and  frankly  stated  that  England's  prosperity  could  only  be  saved  if  Germany 
were  destroyed.  "  England,"  the  article  says  in  part,  "  with  her  long  history 
of  successful  aggression,  with  her  marvelous  conviction  that  in  pursuing  her 
own  interests  she  is  spreading  light  among  nations  dwelling  in  darkness,  and 
Germany,  bone  of  the  same  bone,  blood  of  the  same  blood,  with  a  lesser  will 
force,  but  perhaps  with  a  keener  intelligence,  compete  in  every  corner  of  the 
globe.  In  the  Transvaal,  at  the  Cape,  in  Central  Africa,  in  India  and  the  East, 
the  islands  of  the  Southern  Sea,  and  in  the  far  Northwest,  wherever — and 
where  has  it  not? — the  flag  has  followed  the  Bible  and  trade  has  followed  the 
(lag  there  the  German  bagman  is  struggling  with  the  English  peddler.  Is  there 
a  mine  to  exploit,  a  railway  to  build,  a  native  to  convert  from  breadfruit  to 
tinned  meat,  from  temperance  to  trade  gin,  the  German  and  the  Englishman 
are  struggling  to  be  first.  A  million  petty  disputes  build  up  the  greatest  cause 
of  war  the  world  has  ever  seen.  If  Germany  were  extinguished  to-morrow, 
the  day  after  to-morrow  there  is  not  an  Englishman  in  the  world  who  would 
not  be'richer.  Nations  have  fought  for  years  over  a  city  or  a  right  of  succes- 
sion.   Must  they  not  fight  for  two  hundred  fifty  million  pounds  of  commerce?" 

Doctor  Eohrbach  says: 

We  know  very  well  that  it  does  not  reflect  the  feelings  of  the  whole  of  Eng- 
land, but  nevertheless  of  a  considerable  portion  of  the  English  Nation.     *     *     * 

The  two  political  catch  words,  "reaction"  and  "government  by  feudal 
classes,"  which  foreign  public  opinion  frequently  uses  to  describe  German 
conditions,  arc  not  calculated  to  bring  success  to  the  German  idea  in  the  world. 
But  they  are  not  the  only  obstacles.  Like  other  people,  we  suffer  from  the 
defects  of  our  virtues.  The  reverse  and  unfortunate  complement  of  that  sense 
of  duty  and  industry,  which  we  call  the  positive  poles  of  our  character,  are 
an  offensive  superiority  and  awkwardness  of  behavior,  which  are  constantly 
putting  us  at  a  disadvantage.  *  *  *  Between  these  two  observations  there 
is  so  much  German  awkwardness,  Indolence,  and  ignorance  of  the  national 
idea,  in  its  highest  sense  that  we  can  explain  the  progress  abroad  which  we 
have  made  only  by  the  one  thing  in  which  we  excel  all  other  people:  our  exact 
and  conscientious  labor  and  our  remarkable  diligence. 

The  real  evil  lies  in  the  doctrine  of  political  and  economic  im- 
perialism common  to  so  many  nations — the  doctrine  that  holds  that 
the  economic  welfare  ami  progress  of  every  nation  ami  of  its  people 
depend  upon  securing  constantly  expanding  markets  and  sources  of 
supply,  constantly  expanding  opportunities  For  trade,  and  that  such 
opportunities  are  only  to  be  round,  or  at  least  are  best  to  be  found, 
by  acquiring  political  dominion  over  or  spheres  of  influence  in  other 
countries,  especially  in  countries  relatively  backward  in  industrial 


PREPARATIONS   FOR   PEACE.  9 

development  but  capable  of  such  development.  If  this  is  sound  doc- 
trine economically,  if  it  really  is  enlightened  selfishness,  if  it  is  not 
to  be  restrained  by  the  sense  of  moral  obligation  («»  res  pec<  the  rights 

of  other  nations,  if,  indeed,  the  whole  theory  in  to  be  gilded  and  dis- 
guised by  a  supposed  moral  obligation  to  uplift  the  relatively  back- 
ward peoples  and  develop  the  relatively  undeveloped  lands — the 
theory  of  the  white  man's  burden — it  would  seem  an  irresistible 
conclusion  that  force  must  continue  to  rule  the  world  and  that  peace- 
ful civilization  can  go  forward  only  under  a  dominant  nation  or 
under  a  balance  of  power  between  several  dominant  nations. 

I  do  not  believe  that  this  doctrine  will  indefinitely  continue  to  con- 
trol politics  and  international  relations.  It  is  not  morally  sound. 
It  is  not  economically  sound.  It  is  not  even  enlightened  selfishness. 
It  must  and  will  disappear  with  the  demonstration  of  its  futility. 
This  doctrine  and  civilization,  as  the  masses  of  mankind  are  coming 
to  conceive  of  civilization,  are  irreconcilably  opposed.  Force  as  a 
means  of  promoting  economic  interests  or  of  advancing  intellectual 
ideals  is  certain  to  diminish  and  to  disappear,  just  as  certainly  as 
human  slavery  and  the  imposition  of  theological  or  religious  dogma 
by  force  have  already  disappeared.  The  rapidity  of  the  process  will 
depend  chiefly,  if  not  entirely,  upon  the  progress  of  education  and 
intelligence  among  the  mass  of  mankind.  If,  therefore,  we  desire 
to  reduce  the  chance  of  war,  either  because  it  is  right  for  the  world 
that  it  shall  be  reduced,  or  because  we  are  thinking  only  of  ourselves 
and  wish  to  escape  its  horrors,  if  our  desire  is  to  prepare  for  peace, 
the  surest  way  to  accomplish  this  result  is,  first,  by  seeing  that  our 
own  national  purposes  and  methods  are  not  based  upon  the  desire  for 
economic  expansion  by  means  of  political  dominion  or  special  privi- 
lege, or  any  sort  of  sphere  of  influence  that  discriminates  in  favor  of 
our  people  as  against  those  of  any  other  nation;  and  secondly,  by 
doing  everything  in  our  power  to  bring  other  nations  to  this  same  con- 
clusion, including  active  cooperation  with  other  nations  to  produce 
this  result. 

Our  peace  depends  upon  ourselves  and  upon  the  peace  of  the  world ; 
and  one  of  the  greatest  steps  toward  the  establishment  of  the  world 
peace  upon  which  our  peace  so  largely  depends  is  a  sympathetic  and 
effective  cooperation  between  the  Anglo-Saxon  and  the  German  and 
Scandinavian  nations,  to  which  Earl  Grey  has  referred  as  "nearest 
to  us  in  mind  and  sentiment." 

We  are  told  that  at  the  end  of  the  war  our  potential  enemies  will 
certainly  be  exhausted  and  unable  or  disinclined  to  take  up  a  quarrel 
with  us.  I  wish  I  could  have  the  assurance  upon  this  score  that  some 
of  my  fellow  pacifists  entertain;  but  I  can  not  forecast  either  our  own 
wisdom  or  the  degree  of  human  emotion  and  human  folly  that  will 
survive — that  possibly  may  be  born  of — the  greatest  exhibition  of 
human  emotion  and  human  folly  that  the  world  has  ever  seen.  Our 
first  duty,  our  most  enlightened  selfishness,  is  to  do  everything  in  our 
power  now  and  at  the  close  of  hostilities  to  remove  the  causes  of  war, 
to  create  alternatives  for  war;  but  as  we  can  net  hope  to  remove  every 
cause  for  war,  as  we  can  not  be  sure  that  effective  alternatives  for 
war  will  be  devised  or  will  be  accepted,  we  have  ourselves  no  sane. 
alternative  but  to  be  prepared  for  effective  defense.  We  have  seen 
too  clearly  the  realities  of  war  to  risk  its  coining  or  its  consequences. 

S.  Doc.  323, 6-1-1 2 


10  PREPARATIONS   FOR   PEAOE. 

Our  defense  must  be  real  or  it  will  onty  add  to  our  danger.  Within 
the  limits  of  what  is  strictly  necessary  for  defense  our  preparation 
must  be  made  as  though  it  were  certain  to  be  needed.  No  fear  that 
other  nations  will  be  led  by  our  example  to  increase  their  armament 
unnecessarily  can  stand  for  one  moment  against  the  possibility  of  our 
need.  What  is  incumbent  upon  us  is  to  make  it  as  clear  as  possible 
that  the  character  and  the  extent  of  our  military  preparation  are 
strictly  defensive;  indeed,  our  first  inquiry  should  be  into  the  possi- 
bilities of  a  military  policy  that  will  be  on  its  face  and  in  its  essential 
characteristics  defensive. 

With  the  greatest  deference,  and  subject  to  correction  by  demon- 
stration and  not  by  assertion,  I  venture  to  suggest  that  there  is  such 
a  thing  as  a  defensive  military  policy,  which  is  essentially  different 
in  important  particulars  from  an  aggressive  military  policy,  and  that 
the  plans  for  military  and  naval  preparedness  which  are  being  pre- 
sented to  us  either  by  the  President  and  his  political  advisers,  or 
by  the  General  Board  of  the  Navy,  or  the  General  Staff  of  the  Army, 
do  not  recognize  or  apply  the  distinction. 

I  am  not  discussing  these  things  as  an  expert,  nor  do  I  assume  that 
my  audience  is  composed  of  experts.  I  am,  however,  not  without  the 
support  of  expert  opinion,  although  it  has  not  been  allowed  much 
public  expression.  And  I  assume  that  the  great  audience  of  our 
ordinary  fellow  citizens,  as  inexpert  but  as  intensely  and  vitally  con- 
cerned as  we  are,  will  in  the  end  settle  our  military  policy  on  sea 
and  land,  for  this  is  necessarily  the  way  of  democracy.  Admiral 
Mahan  says: 

Justly  appreciated,  military  affairs  are  one  side  of  the  polities  of  a  nation  and 
therefore  concern  the  individual  who  has  an  interest  in  the  government  of  the 
stale.  They  form  part  of  a  closely  related  whole,  and  putting  aside  the  purely 
professional  details  *  *  *  military  preparations  should  he  determined  chiefly 
by  those  broad  political  considerations  which  affect  the  relations  of  states  one 
to  another  or  of  several  parts  of  the  same  state  to  the  common  defense. 

Robert  Wilden  Neeser,  whose  book,  Our  Navy  and  the  Next  War,  is 
an  argument  for  greater  naval  strength,  nevertheless  says: 

In  the  last  analysis  it  is  the  people  who  govern,  it  is  the  people  who  must  he 
Informed  of  their  military  condition.  The  regulations  which  forbid  military  and 
naval  men  writing  for  publication  for  the  purpose  of  discussion  should  be  re- 
written. The  freest:  discussion  on  all  military  and  naval  topics  by  officers  of 
both  services  should  be  encouraged,  such  writings  to  be  signed  by  the  authors, 
for  which  they  would  assume  the  entire  responsibility.  When  this  privilege 
has  been  given,  then  the  people  will  have  a  means  of  getting  at  the  truth  and 
the  authority  in  each  case  will  be  known.  By  sealing  the  li|»s  of  those  capable 
of  giving  the  truth  we  have  encouraged  scarehead  articles  upon  our  naval  pre- 
paredness which  carry  little  weight  and  make  no  lasting  impression  upon  the 
minds  of  the  people. 

Major-General  Francis  Vinton  Greene  has  also  called  attention  <<> 
the  fact  that  Germany  permits  publication  of  frank  discussions  of 
military  subjects — several  thousand  military  books  in  a  year  as 
against  several  scores  at  the  most  in  English-speaking  countries. 

At  all  events,  whether  they  like  it  or  not,  the  experts  must  convince 
us,  untrained  as  we  are.  What  we  want  and  what  we  arc  entitled  to 
have  is  candor  and  the  fullest,  freest  opportunity  for  the  expression 
of  every  sincere  and  intelligent  judgment  that  has  been  or  is  being 
formed  within  our  military  and  naval  service.  We  are  dealing  with 
what  is  alleged  to  be  and  what  we  believe  is  matter  of  life  and  death. 


PREPARATIONS    FOR    PEACE.  11 

On  such  a  matter  the  order  prohibiting  officers  in  our  military  estab- 
lishment  from  uttering  and  publishing  opinions  upon  military  pol- 
icy1 seems  especially  unwise  and  leaves  the  country  altogether  too 
dependent  upon  the  officials  or  official  boards  that  for  the  moment 
control  the  administration  of  our  military  and  naval  service.  In 
that  service  are  experienced  and  serious  students  of  the  problems  of 
military  and  naval  policy  whose  views  upon  fundamentals  and  upon 
important  details  disagree  with  the  views  of  both  the  military  and 
the  political  heads  of  our  military  and  naval  establishments.  These 
differences  of  opinion  are  not  Icing  given  to  the  public.  We  are 
thus  being  led  to  the  unwarranted  conclusion  that  there  is  unanimity 
among  our  experts  as  to  the  kind  and  extent  of  military  preparation 
we  should  have. 

I  am  a  convinced  advocate  of  securing  and  utilizing  expert  advice 
in  the  administration  of  public  affairs.  I  have  the  highest  regard 
and  respect  for  the  officers  in  our  naval  and  military  service.  I 
attach  the  greatest  importance  to  their  opinions  with  respect  to  the 
things  that  will  produce  the  most  efficient  military  preparation  for 
war  and  that  will  produce  the  greatest  results  in  actual  warfare. 
But  what  we  are  deciding  is  not  the  sort  of  an  army  or  navy  that 
will  be  most  powerful  in  war,  but  what  sort  of  an  army  or  navy  will 
be  most  effective  for  securing  peace.  And  that  is  a  question  which 
involves  issues  of  national  policy  that  are  not  exclusively  military — 
in  which,  indeed,  the  military  motive  is  of  secondary  importance. 

"We  must  tell  the  Navy  Board  and  the  General  Staff — not  have 
them  tell  us — what  it  is  we  want  an  army  and  a  navy  to  do;  what  are 
the  purposes  for  which  we  wish  to  use  an  army  and  a  navy.  Then 
and  then  only  can  they  tell  us  what  kind  of  an  army  and  navy  will 
be  best  adapted  for  our  purpose.  Otherwise  their  opinions  and  esti- 
mates must  necessarily  be  based  on  the  assump-tion  that  we  want  a 
military  establishment  adequate  to  defend  all  our  outstanding  pos- 
sessions and  obligations,  and  to  maintain  all  our  supposed  national 
policies  and  intere;  ts.  and  in  the  event  of  war,  in  the  language  of  the 
recent  report  of  the  War  College,  "  to  insure  a  successful  termination 
of  the  war  in  the  shortest  time." 

All  this  may  sound  somewhat  captious  and  theoretical,  of  little 
practical  value,  but  I  am  not  without  knowledge  that  there  exists 
among  military  experts — and  in  our  own  military  service — a  recog- 
nition of  the  fact  that  there  is  a  substantial  difference  between  a 
defensive  and  an  offensive  military  policy  and  that  it  is  not  being 
recognized  in  the  plans  which  are  officially  recommended  for  our  mili- 
tary preparation.  We  are  being  urged  to  support  a  military  program 
which  we  are  assured  is  intended  only  for  defense;  but  it  is  not  an 
exclusively  defensive  program.  I  do  not  intend  to  impugn  in  any 
degree  the  sincerity  of  its  advocates — I  think  they  believe  that  they 
are  advocating  a  defensive  policy;  but  they  have  not  defined  nor  hud 
defined  for  them  what  it  is  we  wish  to  defend,  nor  have  they  aban- 
doned that  hoary  maxim  of  military  science  that  a  strong  offense  is 
the  best  defense. 

*  •'  Officers  of  tbc  Array  will  refrain,  until  further  orders,  from  sivinj:  out  for  publi- 
cation an.v  interview,  statement,  discussion,  or  article  on  the  military  situation  in  the 
United  States  or  abroad,  .-is  any  expression  of  their  views  en  this  subjecl  at  present  is 
prejudicial  to  the  best  interests  of  the  service." — War  Department,  General  Order  No.  10. 


12  PREPARATIONS   FOR    PEACE. 

We  shall  make  a  serious  mistake  in  all  that  we  do  toward  military- 
preparedness  against  war  and  for  peace  unless  we  tell  our  military 
experts,  and  tell  them  in  a  way  that  they  will  understand  and  accept, 
that  we  want  a  military  establishment  planned  and  prepared  for  de- 
fense and  not  for  offense,  even  though  offense  may  help  defense — ■ 
that  we  consciously  and  definitely  intend  to  abandon  and  to  have 
them  abandon  whatever  military  advantage  there  may  be  in  having 
an  army  and  a  navy  prepared  to  take  the  aggressive  and  to  seek  out 
and  attack  in  force  an  enemy  away  from  our  own  boundaries  and 
waters.  Only  in  this  way  can  Ave  convince  the  world  that  our  object 
is  pacific,  that  we  are  not  merely  repeating  the  hollow  assurances 
of  other  nations  that  have  built  great  navies  and  trained  great  armies 
in  the  name  of  peace  only  to  use  them  for  aggression  when  the  op- 
portunity and  the  temptation  came.  Only  in  this  way  can  we  be  sure 
that  we  shall  not  yield  to  temptation  when  it  comes.  What  is  there 
in  our  national  history  to  justify  the  claim  that  we  will  not  use  force 
to  extend  our  boundaries  or  our  dominion  over  the  lands  of  weaker 
nations,  no  matter  how  sincerely  at  this  time  we  intend  not  to  do  so? 
What  right  have  we  to  thank  God  that  we  are  not  as  other  men, 
especially  those  Prussians?  With  an  army  and  a  navy  designed  for 
and  substantially  limited  to  the  defense  of  our  own  lands  and  shores, 
Ave  can  with  some  confidence  and  effectiveness  advocate  those  prin- 
ciples and  agencies  of  international  policy  that  are  best  adapted  to 
reduce  the  chances  of  war. 

To  illustrate  what  I  have  in  mind,  and  not  I  alone,  but  others 
whose  military  experience  and  training  give  greater  weight  to  their 
opinions,  let  me  ask  you  Avhether  it  is  not  clear  that  a  real  substantial 
clarification  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  adopting  and  extending  the 
suggestions  of  President  Wilson's  message,  Avould  not  in  itself  do 
more  to  make  Avar  against  this  country  unlikely  than  all  the  increase 
Ave  are  likely  to  make  in  our  army  and  our  navy?  We  hear  much  of 
possible  Avar  with  Japan.  Should  we  not  do  more  toAvard  the  pre- 
Aention  of  such  a  war  by  discussing  with  Japan  the  issues  sur- 
rounding Japanese  immigration  and  the  Open  Door  in  China  man 
fashion  and  in  a  way  and  with  results  that  would  do  justice  to  our 
interests  and  to  Japanese  interests  and  to  that  self-respect  which 
Japan  has  earned  her  right  to  entertain?  If  Ave  really  intend  to  give 
national  independence  to  the  Philippines,  should  we  not  remove  a 
great  menace  to  our  peace  if  Ave  could  secure  international  guar- 
anties of  the  sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity  of  the  Filipino 
nation?  If  we  should  open  the  Panama  Canal  to  the  warships  of  all 
nations  under  international  guaranties  of  the  safety  of  the  Canal 
itself  and  of  our  peaceful  ownership  and  operation  of  it,  should  Ave 
not  make  it  a  prize  less  likely  to  excite  the  cupidity  of  other  nations 
and  less  likely  to  lead  to  Avar  with  us?  If  Ave  did  these  things, 
should  we  not  need  an  army  and  a  navy  quite  different  in  character 
and  size  from  those  we  should  need  if  we  do  not  do  (hem?  ("an  we 
intelligently  determine  what  soil  of  an  army  and  a  navy  we  need 
without  considering  what  it  is  we  propose  to  defend?  II'  we  retain 
all  these  posses:  ions  and  interests  and  international  policies,  where 
can  we  slop  in  our  military  preparation?  What  folly  to  retain 
them  if  Ave  do  not  propose  to  make  serious  and  adequate  preparation 
to  defend  them,  and  could  not  make  really  adequate  preparation  if 
Ave  Avould. 


PREPARATIONS   FOR   PEACE.  13 

It  may  be  said  that  those  matters  really  make  no  difference  in  the 
sort  of  military  preparation  we  ought  to  make — that  it  will  require 
the  same  sort  of  an  army  and  the  same  sort  of  a  navy  to  defend  our 
own  lands  and  waters  that  we  should  need  to  defend  the  Philippines 

and  the  Panama  Canal  and  to  enforce  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  No 
doubt  some  military  authorities  would  make  precisely  this  claim; 
but  I  venture  to  assert  that  excellent  military  authority  is  of  quite 
a  different  opinion,  and  that  it  is  supported  by  many  considerations 
that  appeal  and  should  appeal  to  that  great  public  which  under  our 
democratic  government  must  and  should  decide  the  fundamental 
questions  of  policy  directly  involved. 

We  are  at  least  entitled  to  ask  questions.  If  our  navy  is  intended 
only  to  defend  our  own  shores  from  invasion,  could  we  not  enor- 
mously increase  the  number  of  our  submarines  for  the  same  money 
that  it  is  proposed  to  spend  on  dreadnaughts;  and  would  not  the 
result  give  us  a  far  more  effective  navy  for  purely  defensive  pur- 
poses? Does  not  a  single  superdreadnaught  cost  as  much  as  many 
submarines,  depending  on  the  types  selected?  If  modern  war — if 
this  Avar — has  taught  us  anything,  it  is  that  a  navy  of  the  dread- 
naught  class  is  of  little  if  any  practical  value  against  a  stronger 
navy  of  the  same  sort.  The  weaker  navy  is  inevitably  bottled  up. 
It  dare  not  come  out  into  the  open  unless  it  is  prepared  to  risk  all 
upon  the  result  of  its  unequal  contest  with  a  stronger  force.  Unless 
we  are  prepared  to  enter  the  endless  competition  in  naval  expendi- 
ture, is  not  the  navy  of  (lie  era  that  ended  with  this  war  a  waste  of 
money  and  a  self-deception  as  an  efficient  instrument  of  defense? 
Is  not  this  confessed  by  the  insistence  of  those  who  cling  to  this 
type  of  navy  that  the  United  States  must  increase  its  navy  until 
it  equals  the  navy  of  any  other  nation?  Some  say  any  other* nation 
except  England,  either  because  they  are  appalled  at  competition  in 
naval  expenditure  with  England,  whose  existence  as  a  world  power 
depends  upon  predominance  at  sea,  or  because  they  think  we  should 
assume  that  war  will  never  occur  between  England  and  the  United 
States.  Some  insist  that  we  must  have  a  navy  equal  in  aggressive 
strength  to  the  combined  navies  of  any  two  other  nations  except 
England;  and  that  anything  less  than  this  will  leave  us  without 
adequate  protection  for  the  Aery  reasons  that  are  given  as  underlying 
the  dreadnaught  naval  theory.  Has  not  this  war  demonstrated  that 
a  navy  composed  chiefly  of  great  numbers  of  submarines,  supple- 
mented by  the  torpedo  boat,  the  destroyer,  and  the  aeroplane,  would 
be  of  immense  defensive  value  against  the  most  powerful  dread- 
naught  navy  afloat?  Is  not  a  single  submarine  an  effective  fighting 
unit  against  any  fleet,  while  a  single  dreadnaught  is  of  practically 
no  value  whatever?  Might  not  a  few  submarines  encounter  and 
destroy  a  mighty  fleet,  while  a  dreadnaught  navy  outclassed  in 
strength  by  an  invading  squadron  would  lie  impotent  in  the  harbor? 
Are  we  not  about  to  commit  this  nation  to  a  program  of  dread- 
naughts  that  need  yet  more  and  more  dreadnaughts  to  make  them 
useful?  Is  it  not  wise  to  delay  this  program  at  least  until  we  can 
know  more  than  is  now  possible  as  to  the  place  of  the  dreadnaught 
in  the  future  navies  of  the  world?  Secretary  Daniels  says  that  ex- 
pert opinion  on  this  subject  has  undergone  great  fluctuations  within 
the  past  few  months.  He  has  himself  substantially  increased  the 
number  of  submarines  for  which  the  Navy  Department  is  asking 


14  PREPARATIONS    FOR   PEACE. 

over  the  number  recommended  by  the  Navy  Board.  Why  not  spend 
our  dreadnaught  money,  at  least  for  the  present,  on  submarines  and 
other  defensive  agencies?  Even  Neeser  asks  the  question:  "With 
the  offensive  submarine  now  a  certainty,  should  we  continue  to 
build  battleships?"  And  his  answer  is  an  evasion  and  is  also  based 
upon  the  premise  that  "  the  ultimate  aim  of  war  is  to  command  the 
sea."'  Having  already  called  the  offensive  submarine  "a  certainty," 
he  says:  "The  new  cruising  submarine,  if  a  success,  may  become  a 
serious  menace  to  a  battleship  fleet;  but  it  does  not  seem  a  sufficient 
menace  to  stop  the  construction  of  those  ships  which  have  so  long 
and  in  the  face  of  all  challengers  held  command  of  the  sea." 

But  it  may  be  said  that  such  a  navy  as  I  am  discussing  cor1  1  not  be 
used  so  effectively  as  the  dreadnaught  in  foreign  waters  away  from  its 
base.  Precisely  so:  and  is  not  this  one  of  its  chief  advantages  to  us? 
Could  we  do  anything  that  would  so  effectively  stamp  our  military 
policy  as  intended  only  for  defense  as  to  create  a  navy  that,  while 
powerful  for  defense  would  by  its  very  character  have  less  power  for 
aggression?  If  we  wish  only  to  defend  ourselves,  do  we  need  any 
other  navy?  Can  we  do  anything  that  will  so  completely  convinca 
the  world  that  we  mean  what  we  say  when  we  declare  that  we  are 
arming  only  for  peace?  Can  we  do  anything  that  will  so  increase  our 
power  to  influence  other  nations  to  adopt  the  policies  and  the  agencies 
that  make  for  peace?  Even  if  we  had  to  concede  that  a  defensive 
navy  would  lack  some  of  the  aggressive  power  that  we  might  desire 
in  actual  warfare,  can  we  not  well  afford  to  make  this  sacrifice  for  the 
immense  gain  in  making  war  less  likely  to  occur? 

Is  it  not  a  choice  between  this  policy  and  the  race  for  naval  suprem- 
acy which  alone  will  enable  us  "to  command  the  sea"?  Norman 
Angell  may  be  urging  some  propositions  about  which  there  may  well 
be  difference  of  opinion,  but  he  has  at  least  convincingly  demon- 
strated one  fallacy: 

Mr.  Churchill  lays  it  down  as  an  axiom  that  the  way  to  he  sure  of  peace  is  to 
be  so  much  stronger  than  your  enemy  that  he  dare  not  attack  you.  One  wonders 
if  the  Germans  will  lake  his  advice.  It  amounts  to  this:  Here  are  two  likely  to 
quarrel;  how  shall  they  keep  the  peace?  Let  each  be  stronger  than  the  other, 
and  all  will  be  well.  This  "  axiom  "  is.  of  course,  a  physical  absurdity.  On  this 
basis  there  is  no  such  thing  as  adequate  defense  for  either.  If  one  party  to  the 
dispute  is  safe,  the  oilier  is  not,  and  is  entitled  to  try  and  make  itself  so. 

Is  there  not  a  distinctively  defensive  policy  applicable  to  the  army 
just  as  to  the  navy?  The  arguments  for  increased  land  forces  and 
reserves  seem  entirely  sound.  But  this  does  not  relieve  us — even  us 
laymen — from  the  necessity  of  considering  what  they  should  be  and 
how  they  should  be  obtained.  I  do  not  propose  to  discuss  details  of 
military  organization.  It  is  important,  however,  for  the  public  to 
understand  that  there  are  differences  of  opinion  and  of  interest  in 
the  army  as  to  what  branches  of  the  service  should  be  increased.  I 
am  expressing  no  opinion,  except  that  there  should  be  complete  free- 
dom in  the  service  for  the  public  discus-ion  of  (lie  issues. 

All  the  military  opinion  about  which  I  know  anything  is  agreed 
thai  tor  a  defensive  policy  we  need  trained  officers,  trained  infantry, 
trained  artillery,  adequate  equipment,  and  both  an  adequate  supply 
of  munitions  and  provision  for  increasing  and  maintaining  an  ade- 
quate supply  of  the  things  for  which  modern  war  makes  such  insa- 
tiate demands.    Does  the  program  of  preparedness  that  has  been  pre- 


PREPARATIONS   FOR  PEACE.  15 

pared  for  us  contemplate  these  things?  We  are  told  that  our  prepa- 
ration must  be  a  genuine  and  a  serious  thing,  that  at  the  close  of  this 
Avar  some  victorious  nation  or  combination  of  nations  may  decide  to 
use  its  trained  and  veteran  troops  against  us  in  resentment,  or  envy 
or  lust  of  power  or  hope  of  Loot,  and  that  we  must  be  ready  and  re- 
main ready,  that  we  must  keep  our  powder  dry.  We  are  t<  Id  that 
only  thorough  training  and  the  very  best  equipment  for  an  army  in  the 
leash  would  avail  for  our  defense.  And  how  is  it  proposed  to  secure 
such  an  army?  Make  a  small  increase  in  cur  regular  troops  and  give 
a  citizen  soldiery  annually  a  few  months'  intensive  training  that  will 
not  interfere  too  seriously  with  their  business  and  professional  occu- 
pations. Is  there  then  no  serious  need  for  preparing  against  the 
possibility  of  a  read  invasion? 

The  truth  is  that  at  and  for  some  time  after  the  close  of  this  war 
the  United  States  may  be  in  less  danger  from  attack  than  at  any  time 
in  its  history.  We  all  hope  with  differing  degrees  of  confidence  that 
out  of  the  horrors  and  destruction  of  this  war  will  come  a  real  ad- 
vance toward  some  form  of  international  relations  and  international 
arrangements  that  will  reduce  the  burdens  of  armament  and  the 
probabilities  of  war.  If  our  hopes  were  really  more  than  hopes,  this 
nation  might  well  await  the  outcome  without  increasing  at  this 
time  its  military  establishment — not  that  we  might  not  then  take  wise 
precautions  to  meet  the  actual  situation  that  will  then  be  disclosed, 
but  that  we  could  be  so  much  wiser  then  than  we  possibly  can  be 
now.  It  is  because  our  hopes  are  only  hopes,  and  not  certainties, 
that  we  are  urged  to  prepare  now  against  a  possibility  that  might  be 
so  unspeakably  disastrous  to  this  country,  to  its  men.  and  especially 
to  its  women  and  its  children,  that  we  are  not  justified  in  delaying  at 
least  adequate  preparation  to  resist  attack.  But  if  we  are  really  to 
prepare  against  a  real  attack,  what  folly  it  is  to  be  less  than  ade- 
quately prepared.  We  should  analyze  the  situation  that  is  at  all 
likely  to  confront  us  and  meet  that  situation.    What  is  the  situation? 

It  seems  clear  that  we  need  anticipate  no  attack  from  Great 
Britain  or  indeed  from  any  of  her  allies  for  seme  time  after  this 
war,  no  matter  what  its  outcome,  unless  Ave  ourselves  furnish  some 
neAv  and  gratuitous  occasion  for  a  quarrel.  For  a  hundred  years  we 
have  settled  amicably  every  issue  with  Great  Britain,  and  many  of 
the  issues  have  been  peculiarly  irritating  and  important  to  both  na- 
tions. Our  substantive  relations  Avere  never  more  sympathetically 
friendly,  and  neAv  causes  would  have  to  arise  to  strain  them.  Our 
diplomatic  relations  Avere  never  so  assured  by  treaties  providing  for 
the  peaceful  settlement  of  issues  upon  which  we  may  disagree.  Cer- 
tainly this  is  true  of  Great  Britain;  and  with  her  friendship  and 
the  already  increased  and  growing  appreciate  n  of  the  reality  and 
value  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  tie,  a  Avar  betAveen  the  two  great  Anglo- 
Saxon  nations  is  practically  unthinkable.  I  mention  Great  Britain 
because  it  seems  not  worth  while  to  discuss  the  effect  of  our  prox- 
imity to  Canada  in  the  event  of  Avar.  Canada  is  probably  a  hostage 
in  our  reach  against  Avar  with  England;  but  let  us  assume  that  it 
would  be  a  military  asset  for  Great  Britain.  No  other  first-class 
power  except  England  has  any  foothold  in  North  America  from 
which  land  forces  could  be  drawn  or  in  which  they  could  be  landed. 
Any  other  formidable  enemy  would  be  compelled  to  transport  its 


16  PKEPARATIOISTS   FOR   PEACE. 

invading  army  across  the  ocean.  I  have  had  no  opportunity  to 
examine  or  to  discuss  with  military  officers  in  whose  judgment  I 
have  confidence  the  recent  report  of  the  War  College  Division  of  the 
General  Staff.  We  are  all,  however,  entitled  to  question  its  sound- 
ness or  its  availability,  as  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of  War 
have  questioned  them.    They  are  civilians  like  ourselves. 

General  Greene,  however,  has  discussed  at  some  length  the  prob- 
lems presented  to  us  in  the  event  of  such  invasion  and  has  advised 
us  of  the  conclusions  of  such  military  students  as  Freiherr  von 
Edelsheim  in  the  service  of  the  German  General  Staff.  His  con- 
clusion is  that  our  initial  problem  would  be  to  prevent  the  landing, 
or  to  defeat  after  it  landed,  a  force  of  240,000  infantry  with  the 
ordinary  normal  complement  of  cavalry,  artillery,  stores,  etc.,  and 
that  this  is  the  largest  force  that  it  would  be  practicable  to  transport 
to  our  shores  as  a  single  expedition.  The  War  College  now  makes  a 
larger  estimate.  Germany  has  permitted  the  public  discussion  of 
military  problems  of  this  sort.  We  have  refused  or  restricted  it. 
The  weight  of  available  military  authority,  however,  seems  agreed 
that  we  should  have  500,000  trained  soldiers  to  meet  an  invasion, 
and  that  this  number  of  really  trained  men  adequately  equipped 
would  successfully  repel  the  invasion.  It  may  be  that,  considering 
the  disadvantages  attending  disembarkation,  substantially  less  than 
this  number  would  suffice  for  effective  defense,  provided  they  are 
trained  soldiers,  and  not  half-trained  militia  or  national  guardsmen. 
I  speak  in  no  terms  of  disrespect  of  our  militia — quite  the  contrary. 
I  merely  insist  upon  the  fact,  recognized  by  the  intelligent  militia 
officers  themselves,  that  men  in  active  civil  life  who  give  all  the  time 
they  can  to  military  training  can  not  successfully  oppose  regular 
troops.  The  militia  can  quickly  become  an  army,  but  it  can  not  be 
an  army;  and  what  we  should  need  if  an  invasion  threatened  us 
would  be  an  army.  Then  let  us  have  an  army — no  larger  than  we 
need  for  the  purpose  of  manning  our  defenses  and  repelling  an  in- 
vasion, but  a  real  army  of  real  soldiers  adequate  for  this  purpose 
and  a  militia  adequate  to  fill  the  ranks  as  they  need  filling.  I  do  not 
say  500,000  men;  I  say  what  number  we  need  for  the  defensive  pur- 
pose which  we  intend  to  accomplish. 

The  suggestion  of  universal  military  service  in  this  country  can  be 
intelligently  determined  only  by  considering  separately  each  of  the 
objects  for  which  it  is  alleged  to  be  desirable.  Its  main — its  real — 
purpose  is  military.  If  it  is  not  necessary  or  at  least  desirable  for 
strictly  military  purposes,  it  will  never  be  adopted  because  of  its 
alleged  physical  or  disciplinary  benefits.  And  for  what  conceivable 
purpose  of  military  defense  should  we  train  to  arms  millions  of  the 
young  men  of  the  United  States?  From  a  military  point  of  view 
this  surely  would  be  a  senseless  waste  of  time,  energy,  and  money.  If 
we  arc  to  have  an  army,  let  us  have  a  real  army.  1  mined  and  cllicient 
for  its  purpose.  Let  us  have  no  superficial  training  of  millions  of 
schoolboys,  no  amateurish  conscription  of  (he  adult  manhood  of  the 
nation,  creating  a  paper  force  immensely  greater  than  any  possible 
need  for  any  purpose  (hat  we  ought  to  entertain,  only  to  demonstrate 
its  inefficiency  if  a  (est  of  strength  should  come,  to  disseminate 
through  the  nation  a  false  feeling  of  security,  and  to  encourage  the 
natural  tendency  toward  brag  and  bluster  to  which  Brother  Jonathan 
has  been  unfortunately  susceptible. 


PREPARATIONS    FOR    PEACH.  17 

There  is  undoubtedly  a  strong  feeling  in  the  United  States  that,  no 
matter  -what  we  should  do  in  the  way  of  military  preparation,  we 
should  be  in  no  danger  of  imperialistic  ambition  or  that  aggressive 
militarism  which  precisely  the  same  policy  has  undoubtedly  tended 
to  create  elsewhere.  There  is  far  greater  danger  from  these  sources 
than  our  people  realize.  This  false  assumption  of  a  superior  resist- 
ing power  of  Americans  to  the  allurements  of  imperialism  and 
national  expansion  only  makes  the  danger  more  real.  Human  nature 
is  essentially  the  same  in  Prussia  and  in  the  United  States. 

It  is  not  in  Germany  alone  that  the  Nietzschean  exaltation  of  the 
Will  to  Power  stirs  the  atavistic  savage  that  lingers  in  mo£G  of  us 
and  in  some  of  us  to  an  exceptional  degree.  Few  Americans  may 
believe  that  war  is  a  biological  necessity,  but  many  are  easily  per- 
suaded that  it  is  a  necessity  on  other  grounds,  and  its  exhibition  of 
primitive  virtues  and  barbarian  vigor  distracts  attention  from  its 
hideous  cruelties  and  its  senseless  waste.  We  need  to  be  constantly 
reminded  that  mankind  is  not  degenerating  because  it  is  finding  less 
use  for  some  superb  qualities  of  the  animal  and  the  savage,  that 
evolution  is  out  of  the  jungle,  not  back  into  it. 

If  German  blood  or  German  training  makes  men  more  prone  to 
exalt  force  in  international  affairs,  it  will  be  well  for  us  to  remember 
that  in  1910  there  were  in  the  United  States  8,282,618  people  who 
were  born  in  Germany,  or  one  or  both  of  whose  parents  were  born 
in  that  country.  This  takes  no  account  of  more  than  2,000,000  of 
our  population  similarly  derived  from  Austria. 

If  the  United  States  is  to  have  increased  military  forces — and  it 
seems  essential  that  we  shall — let  us  not  be  blind  to  the  dangers  that 
are  inseparable  from  military  training  and  military  strength.  Let 
us  endure  with  patience  the  taunts  of  the  militant  pacifist  whose 
motto  is  "  Speak  softly  and  carry  a  big  stick."  I  try  sometimes  to 
visualize  that  peace-loving  and  peace-seeking  community  in  which 
that  motto  is  carried  into  practical  effect,  as  its  distinguished  author 
illustrates  it  in  his  own  delightful  way.  Picture  to  yourselves  the 
citizens  of  Chicago  leaving  their  homes  in  the  morning,  each  armed 
with  a  big  stick,  suited  to  his  taste — one  with  beautifully  polished 
knobs  on  the  heavy  end  of  the  stick  and  one  with  nails  carefully  dis- 
posed upon  its  surface,  to  emphasize  the  value  of  the  weapon  as  a 
deterrent  of  force  and  an  incentive  to  peace — each  swinging  his  little 
pacifier  jauntily  as  he  trudges  sturdily  or  saunters  leisurely  along, 
speaking  softly  to  those  he  passes  about  mollycoddles,  cowards,  and 
the  Ananias  Club.  How  certain  it  would  be  that  no  thought  of 
violence  would  disturb  the  peaceful  serenity  of  such  a  happy  com- 
munity. It  is  an  excellent  motto,  but  hard  to  live  up  to,  and  we  shall 
do  well  not  to  underestimate  the  difficulty.  Nations,  like  individuals, 
when  they  carry  big  sticks,  seem  predisposed  to  raise  their  voices. 

It  is  said  that  the  disbandment  of  our  armies  after  the  Civil  War 
demonstrates  that  military  training  will  not  create-  a  militaristic 
sentiment  in  the  United  Stales,  but  it  is  not  from  those  who  have  had 
actual  experience  in  war  and  have  gone  through  the  pit  of  hell,  or  at 
least  looked  into  its  mouth,  that  we  need  fear  militaristic  sentiment 
so  much  as  from  the  man  who  has  merely  worn  the  trappings  and 
studied  the  manual  of  arms.  It  is  the  little  knowledge  that  is  the 
dangerous  thing. 

S.  Doc.  323,  (34-1 3 


18  PREPARATIONS   FOR    PEACE. 

Has  consideration  beep  given  to  the  political  dangers  of  an  organ- 
ized citizen  soldiery  containing  millions  of  men,  who  would  not 
regard  the  military  work  seriously  because  war  would  not  really 
seem  imminent? 

The  suggestion  of  a  new  sort  of  army — a  continental  army — is 
obviously  due  to  the  desire  to  meet  the  difficulty  of  putting  the 
militia  under  direct  Federal  control,  for  it  proposes  nothing  but  a 
partially  trained  force  of  volunteers.  Does  it  not  seem  far  wiser  to 
extend  Federal  support  to  the  militia  upon  condition  that  the  train- 
ing shall  comply  with  Federal  requirements? 

Has  not  Scharnhorst  shown  us  our  true  military  policy,  when  by 
transferring  every  man  to  the  reserve  as  soon  as  he  had  been  trained, 
the  active  army  of  42.000  men.  to  which  he  was  restricted  by  the 
Peace  of  Paris,  became  the  army  of  150.000  that  contributed  so 
powerfully  to  the  defeat  of  Napoleon?  Why  should  we  not  adopt 
the  policy  of  training  our  soldiers  as  intensively  as  possible  and  then 
transfer  them,  as  soon  as  they  are  trained,  to  a  reserve  receiving 
proper  pay  from  the  Government  and  subject  to  be  called  to  the 
colors  whenever  needed?  Would  not  such  a  plan  give  us  a  vastly 
superior  army  to  that  available  in  any  other  way?  Would  it  be  any 
less  a  citizen  soldiery  because  it  had  one  year's  continuous  training 
instead  of  three  months'  training  for  each  of  four  years?  Would 
not  the  interference  with  business  or  professional  activity  be  far  less 
and  the  cost  to  the  country  far  less  than  under  the  plans  proposed? 

If  some  mechanical  training  accompanied  the  military  training, 
it  might  extend  the  period  of  active  service,  but  might  it  not  equip 
the  soldier  for  a  more  useful  citizenship  and  make  enlistment  more 
attractive?  The  same  thought  applies  to  the  education  of  the  reserve 
of  trained  officers  that  should  be  provided. 

Universal  military  service  would  undoubtedly  distribute  the  mili- 
tary burden,  but  it  would  create  the  burden  for  the  sake  of  distribut- 
ing it.  It  is  not  "  shirking  "  to  oppose  the  imposition  on  our  people 
of  a  burden  which  it  is  both  unnecessary  and  unwise  for  them  to 
assume.  By  making  service  in  the  army  and  in  the  militia  of  real 
value  to  those  who  enlist,  as  well  as  to  the  nation,  we  should  create  a 
military  system  that  would  justify  itself,  and  that  would  secure  forces 
amply  sufficient  for  our  defense.  There  should  be  no  illusion  as 
to  the  effect — if  not  the  purpose — of  doing  more  than  this.  Our 
sons,  once  trained,  would  be  available  for  war  beyond  our  borders, 
and  even  statutory  declarations  against  using  them  there  would  not 
remove  the  consequences  of  their  availability.1 

It  may  well  be  questioned  whether  the  agitation  for  universal  mili- 
tary training  or  any  other  form  of  conscription  does  not  tend  to  dis- 
credit and  to  prevent  a  degree  of  actual  military  preparation  which 
might  otherwise  receive  popular  support. 

It  is  said  that  what  we  hick  in  the  United  States  is  discipline,  and 
that  military  discipline  will  supply  the  need.     We  do  want  civic 


i  on  January   l.   L916,  the  Associated  Press  sent  out  from   Washington  a  dispatch  for 

which    it    claimed   exceptionally    reliable   information,   stating    that:    "a    navy    equal    in 

strength  to  those  <-f  any  two  world  powers  except  Oreal   Britain,  and  an  army  prepared 

the  Integrity  of  the  Pan-American  idea  anywhere  in  Pan-America  is  the  ulti- 

i i in  of  the  plans  of  the  military  pxperts." 

January    <>.    1916,    Secretary    Garrison    said    heforc   the    Military    Committee   of    the 
:  "We  have  determined  and  announced  that  the  sovereignty  of 
the  other  republics  of  this  hem!  phere  Bhall  remain  Inviolable  and  must  therefore  at  all 
times  Stand  ready  to  make  good  our  position  in  this  connection." 


PREPARATIONS    FOR    PEACE.  19 

discipline,  the  conscious  and  willing  subordination  of  immediate  in- 
dividual freedom  of  action  to  concerted  and  cooperative  control  for 
the  good  of  the  community,  a  control  in  determining  the  extent  and 
character  and  purpose  of  which  the  disciplined  shall  have  a  voice. 
Shall  we  get  this  from  a  training  that  consists  chiefly  if  not  wholly 
in  obedience  to  orders?  No  military  discipline  in  or  out  of  the 
schools  can  be  made  much  more  than  this  for  the  great  mass  under 
the  practical  limitations  that  must  prevail.  Few,  indeed,  will  be  the 
individuals  who  will  lie  trained  to  direct  others,  ami  these  few  will 
learn  chiefly  to  direct  the  others  in  a  routine  essentially  arbitrary 
and  mechanical. 

Theirs  not  («>  reason  why, 

Theirs  but  to  do  and  die, 

is  the  ideal  of  military  discipline,  the  quality  we  are  called  upon  to 
praise  and  admire  in  the  soldier.  It  is  an  admirable  ideal  for  mili- 
tary purposes,  but  not  so  good  for  civic  purposes,  and  what  we  are 
now  discussing  is  the  alleged  civic  advantage  of  military  discipline 
upon  the  young  manhood  of  the  country. 

As  to  the  suggestion  that  military  drill  in  the  public  schools  would 
be  justified  on  the  ground  of  physical  development.  President  Lowell, 
of  Harvard,  says  that  his  experience  on  the  Boston  School  Board 
convinced  him  that  military  drill  in  the  public  schools  is  a  mistake; 
that  the  boys  tired  of  drill,  and  were  disinclined  later  to  join  the 
militia.  He  thinks  other  kinds  of  physical  training  are  better,  and 
that  while  his  objection  does  not  apply  to  colleges,  drill  should  be  a 
very  small  part  of  military  training. 

Former  President  Eliot  says : 

I  feel  strongiy  another  objection  (o  military  drill  in  secondary  schools,  namely, 
that  it  gives  no  preparation  whatever  for  the  real  work  of  a  soldier.  In  the 
Boston  High  Schools  military  drill  includes  nothing  bin  the  manual  of  arms, 
company  movements  on  even  surfaces,  and  a  few  very  simple  battalion  move- 
ments, mostly  those  of  parade.  The  real  work  of  a  soldier  Is  to  dig  in  the 
ground  with  nick  and  shovel;  to  carry  a  burden  of  about  fifty  pounds  on  long 
marches;  to  run  very  short  distances  carrying  a  similar  burden;  and  to  shoot 
accurately  with  a  rifle;  throw  hand  grenades;  ami  use  rapidly  and  well  machine 
guns  and  artillery.  Military  drill  in  s<  lioois  has  no  tendency  to  prepare  boys 
to  do  the  real  work  of  a  soldier.  The  Swiss  do  not  begin  to  train  their  young 
men  for  their  army  until  they  are  about  twenty  years  of  age,  except  that  they 
encourage  voluntary  rifle  clubs  for  practice  in  shooting. 

Assuming,  however,  that  there  would  be  both  physical  and  dis- 
ciplinary advantages  in  military  training,  it  would  not  follow  that 
we  should  obtain  these  advantages  by  compulsory  military  service. 

It  is  said  that  military  training  would  increase  respect  for  law 
and  order,  and  the  pros)!'  of  this  is  said  to  lie  the  comparative  sta- 
tistics of  crimes  of  violence  in  Switzerland  and  the  United  States. 
How  about  the  comparative  respect  for  law  in  England  and  in  the 
United  States,  although  England  has  not  adopted  universal  military 
training ' 

If  we  were  situated  as  is  Switzerland,  where  any  war  or  serious 
threat  of  war  is  certain  to  require  the  military  service  of  every  able- 
bodied  citizen,  and  where,  even  then,  every  unit  in  the  small  popula- 
tion must  have  the  very  highest"  military  efficiency  practicable,  we 
might  justify  universal  military  training,  in  and  out  of  the  schools. 
We  may  be  sure  that  any  attempt  with  us  to  train  a  citizen  soldiery 


20  PREPAEATIONS   FOE   PEACE. 

under  the  Swiss  system  would  almost  certainly  be  perfunctory,  be- 
cause it  would  not  be  taken  seriously.  We  must  never  forget  that  the 
discipline  which  Germany  has  given  her  citizens  is  a  discipline  which 
is  not  confined  to  their  service  in  the  army.  The  German  people  are 
trained  to  regard  the  state  as  the  instrumentality  through  and  by 
which  they — each  of  them  individually  and  all  of  them  collectively — 
can  best  advance  their  interests — can  best  secure  for  themselves  the 
necessities  and  the  pleasures  of  life.  Behind  even  the  verboten  is  a 
larger  consciousness  of  the  advantages  of  communal  action,  a  larger 
practical  realization  of  those  advantages,  than  obtains  in  any  other 
great  nation  to-day. 

Germany's  industrial  and  social  progress  has  been  attained  in  spite 
of,  and  not  because  of,  her  system  of  enforced  military  training  and 
service.  Undoubtedly  the  conviction  which  has  existed  in  Germany 
that  war  was  a  real  and  constantly  impending  probability  has  had  an 
influence,  perhaps  a  determining  influence,  in  securing  the  adoption 
of  certain  policies,  such  as  the  government  ownership  and  operation 
of  railroads,  and  the  development  of  waterways  in  connection  with 
the  railroads  as  a  "coordinated"  and  interdependent  transportation 
system.  The  same  conviction  of  the  imminence  of  war  has  perhaps 
had  its  influence  in  securing  some  of  the  social  and  industrial  legis- 
lation which  sound  views  of  public  policy  justify  and  demand  with- 
out the  slightest  regard  to  their  military  value.  There  is  no  evidence, 
however,  that  these  social  and  industrial  results  in  Germany  were 
due  to,  the  military  training  of  German  citizens.  Prussia  is  not  the 
portion  of  the  German  Empire  in  which  we  find  the  most  inspiring 
examples  of  peaceful  progress.  Again  I  find  Paul  Rohrback  instruc- 
tive when  he  points  out  the  antagonism  of  "  the  material  provincial- 
ism of  the  small  state  and  the  old  individualism  of  the  German  races, 
which  in  this  case  has  been  hardened  and  quickened  by  the  long 
political  separation."    He  says: 

But  we  Germans  of  the  Empire  err  if  we  think  that  this  explanation  settles 
the  question.  An  equal  share  of  the  responsibility  for  the  existing  estrangement 
should  be  laid  at  the  door  of  the  North  German  element,  which  has  gained 
hegemony  in  the  now  Empire,  and  which  shows  its  inability  to  achieve  in  the 
world  whal  one  may  call  moral  conquests.  The  shortsighted  Inflexibility  of  the 
North  German,  and  most  especially  of  the  Prussian  character,  which  can  pro- 
duce great  things  only  among  its  own  people,  is  easily  explained  by  the  course 
of  ils  history.  It  deserves  great,  and  perhaps  even  the  sole,  credit  for  the 
growth  of  Prussia  to  the  state  of  a  world  power,  and  therefore,  indirectly, 
for  the  union  of  the  greater  number  of  integral  parts  of  the  old  Empire  into 
the  new  Empire.  Nevertheless,  this  special  side  of  the  Prussian  character  is 
developing  more  ami  more  into  an  actual  source  of  danger  for  our  national 
future,  especially  in  its  modern  unpleasant  variations. 

No;  German  social  and  industrial  progress  is  not  due  to  military 
training,  but,  as  Paul  Rohrback  says,  to  Germany  industry,  and  to 
the  fact  that  Germany  has  made  more  progress  toward  having  her 
government  perform  the  true  functions  of  government  in  its  internal 
and  peaceful  relations  to  its  citizens  than  has  been  made  by  other 
governments,  especially  our  own.  Unless  our  preparation  is  not  only 
planned  for  defense,  and  is,  as  far  as  practicable,  unadapted  for 
aggie-- ion.  the  preparation  itself  will  add  to  the  possibilities  of  war. 
because  we  shall  be  less  afraid  of  the  consequences  of  mistake  and 
less  on  our  guard  against  those  who  from  ignorance  or  self-interest 
seek  to  persuade  us  to  maintain  unsound  national  ideals  or  purposes. 


PREPAEATIONS    FOR   PEACE.  21 

Other  nations  may,  of  course,  make  the  same  sort  of  mistake ;  may 
permit  themselves  to  assert  against  us  interests  that  are  not  their  true 
interests  or  that  they  have  no  right  to  assert.  We  may  have  to  defend 
ourselves  against  aggression  born  of  their  mistakes,  but  so  far  as 
actual  war  is  concerned  we  are  in  far  loss  danger  from  the  selfishness 
or  muddled  thinking  of  other  nations  than  we  are  from  the  selfishness 
or  muddled  thinking  of  our  own  people.  We  are  defended,  not  only 
by  our  geographical  separation  from  Europe  and  Asia,  but  by  the 
character  of  our  country  itself,  its  extent  and  physical  conformation, 
and,  more  than  all  this,  by  the  conflicting  interests  of  our  possible 
enemies.  The  balance  of  power  in  Europe  has  always  been  more  of 
a  defense  to  us  than  even  our  isolation.  The  conquest  of  the  United 
States  has  been  impossible — the  attempt  unthinkable — except  by  land 
and  naval  forces  too  large  to  be  spared  from  Europe.  It  was  largely 
because  of  this  condition  that  we  succeeded  in  the  war  of  the  Revo- 
lution, and  got  off  with  a  little  humiliation  in  1812.  Only  the 
creation  in  Europe  as  a  result  of  this  war  of  new  conditions  in  which 
one  or  other  of  the  contending  parties  is  left  so  completely  crushed 
as  to  destroy  all  fear  from  that  nation  in  the  mind  of  the  victor  or 
victors  can  possibly  threaten  us,  and  then  the  victor  must  have  some 
motive,  must  see  some  advantage,  in  making  war  upon  us. 

No  European  nation  can  have  any  real  motive  to  attack  the  United 
States  except  to  prevent  us  from  asserting  claims  or  exercising  rights 
in  other  countries  which  are  not  in  accordance  with  its  interests. 
There  can  be  no  motive  of  conquest,  and  it  is  equally  unthinkable  that 
any  European  nation  would  make  war  on  us  to  impose  discrimina- 
tory commercial  or  political  conditions  upon  us,  or  merely  to  punish 
us  or  to  loot  us  or  force  from  us  a  money  payment  as  the  price  of 
peace.  Theoretically,  any  of  these  things  might  happen;  practically 
they  can  be  dismissed  from  serious  consideration. 

If  the  United  States  becomes  involved  in  war  it  will  be  because  it 
asserts  somej^htLOf-xlaims  some  privilege  outside  of  its  own  terri- 
tory, the  assertion  of  which  right  or  privilege  runs  counter  to  the 
interests  of  some  foreign  power,  or  it  will  be  because  some  foreign 
power  asserts  a  similar  right  or  privilege  against  us.  We  can  not 
of  ourselves  control  the  motives  or  the  actions  of  other  powers 
except  by  international  agreementrl)acked  by  IFqrce  or  by  measures 
short  of  force  whichTnay  be  equally  effective  for  the  purpose.  Our 
first  concern,  however,  is  with  our  own  aTHtucle  towarcTThese  matters. 
What  are  the  rights  or  privileges  we  claim  or  wish  to  claim  outside 
of  our  own  territory?  Are  we  claiming  or  are  Ave  likelyto  claim  any 
rights  or  privileges  that  are  likely  to  be  Hmllpngpf)  by  other  nations'? 
What  are  the  foundations  for  such  claims?  Are  they  sound  in 
princj£leand_jn  law?  How  important  to  us  is.  their  assertion  if 
challenged^  Are  they  important  enough  to  fight  for?  Are  there 
other  remedies  than  war  available  to  ""us  if  they  are  challenged? 
What  are  they?  Is  our  claim  similar  in  character  to  that  of  other 
nations,  and  should  we  take  steps  to  unite  all  nations  who  are  in- 
terested in  the  samejesgential  claims  forits  defense__against  a  possible 
aggressor?  Should  weunite  North  aruT  ^outh  America  in  the  de- 
fense of  our  common  interests,  and  if  this  seems  desirable,  why 
should  we  draw  an  artificial  line  excluding  agreements  with  Euro- 
pean nations  in  matters  Avhere  our  common  interests  are  as  clear  as, 
or  clearer  than,  our  Pan  American  interests  ? 


22  PREPARATIONS   FOR    PEACE. 

To  reach  right  answers  to  these  questions  we  must  above  all  clear 
our  minds  of  the  false  doctrine  that  enduring  economic  interests  can 
be  promoted  by  force.  Undoubtedly  temporary  advantages  can  be 
secured  b}^  the  exploitation  of  other  nations,  especially — perhaps 
exclusively — undeveloped  peoples  and  undeveloped  lands:  but  in  the 
long  run  the  commercial  interests  of  the  world  are  mutual.  Our 
prosperity  is  dependent  upon  prosperity  elsewhere.  Every  nation 
obtains  materials  or  goods  from  others  and  sells  to  others  its  own 
surplus  of  materials  or  goods.  Every  nation  has  most  to  gain  by 
helping  to  advance  the  trade  of  the  world;  to  make  all  nations  pros- 
perous while  fostering  its  own  commerce  by  every  means  consistent 
with  sound  economic  laws.  So  far  as  the  happiness  of  the  mass  of 
mankind  or  of  the  masses  of  any  particular  nation  is  concerned  the 
adjustment  of  world  commerce  to  the  natural  laws  of  commerce 
wholly  overbalances  the  temporary  advantages  of  exploitation.  Oth- 
erwise it  would  be  to  the  economic  interest  of  this  nation  to  encour- 
age the  continuation  of  the  war  in  Europe  so  that  we  might  continue 
our  artificial  trade  in  munitions.  We  owe  much  to  Norman  Angell 
for  his  convincing  presentation  in  effective  popular  form  of  the 
economic  fallacy  that  world  commerce  follows  national  lines  and 
that  imperialism  is  commercially  profitable. 

The  imperialistic  theory  is  built  upon  the  history  of  the  British 
Empire  and  upon  a  misunderstanding  of  that  history,  especially 
upon  a  failure  to  comprehend  that  economic  conditions  are  now  so 
radically  and  irrevocably  different  that  the  British  Empire  itself 
is  commercially  and  politically  revolutionized.  The  history  of  Eng- 
land can  not  be  repeated  any  more  than  can  the  history  of  Rome, 
and  wise  men  would  not  desire  to  repeat  either  if  they  could.  AVo 
can  not  ignore  the  process  by  which  the  wor.M  has  been  convinced 
that  the  welfare  of  the  mass  of  the  people  is  the  real  test  of  national 
success.  Privilege  may  gain  from  exploitation,  but  not  democracy; 
and  democracy  has  come  to  stay  as  the  economic,  social,  and  intel- 
lectual ideal  of  civilization  even  more  than  as  a  political  ideal.  This 
will  be  clearer  to  mankind  after  this  war,  and  we  may  suspect  that 
it  is  becoming  clearer  and  clearer  during  the  war.  Right  now  in  the 
trenches  no  power  can  keep  the  soldier  from  thinking  and  thinking 
about  the  state  and  his  relation  to  it.  Even  if  he  is  led  to  magnifv 
the  value  of  organization  and  efficiency,  he  intends  to  ask  for  organi- 
zation and  efficiency  in  his  interest  and  not  in  the  interests  of  privi- 
lege or  class. 

The  very  first  thing  that  we  Americans  should  consider  to-day  is 
the  relation  which  we  wish  our  Government  to  assume  toward  us  as 
individuals  and  toward  other  nations.  Our  whole  attitude  toward 
this  war  and  its  results  depends  upon  our  conception  of  the  function 
of  the  state.  What  are  our  ideals  of  the  individual  life  and  of  com- 
munity life?  Do  we  conceive  that  the  most  desirable  life  for  our- 
selves— for  individual  men — is  the  life  in  which  there  is  the  least 
possible  restraint  upon  individual  freedom  of  action,  not  only  the 
action  of  each  man  in  those  things  that  concern  him  alone— if,  in- 
deed, there  are  any  such  things — but  also  in  those  things  that  affect 
other-,  leaving  the  result  of  the  conflict  between  individuals  to  be 
decided  by  the  relative  strength  or  cunning  of  the  individual?  There 
are  those  who.  consciously  or  otherwise,  really  desire  a  world  in 
which  the  strong,  the  astute,  the  intellectually  and  physically  su- 


PREPARATIONS    FOR   PEACE.  23 

perior  are  to  have  the  fullest  freedom  to  enjoy  every  advantage 
which  they  can  obtain  over  their  inferiors.  If  they  are  shrewder,  if 
more  farseeing,  if  they  are  stronger,  more  vigorous  physically  and 
intellectually,  they  contend  that  it  is  their  right  to  anticipate  those 
who  are  less  alert,  less  farseeing,  less  cunning,  in  seizing  the  things 
or  the  positions  that  are  available,  and  that,  having  seized  them,  it  is 
their  vested  right  to  hold  them,  even  when  it  becomes  clear  that  these 
things  and  these  points  of  vantage  are  essential  to  the  community  as 
a  whole  and  to  the  general  mass  of  mankind.  Men  who  hold  this 
view  regard  it  as  a  merit,  as  a  demonstration  of  worth,  that  they  fore- 
saw what  some  day  the  community  would  need,  some  natural  re- 
source, some  particular  piece  of  property,  the  potential  value  of 
which  was  not  generally  appreciated  at  the  time,  and  that  they  ac- 
quired it  so  that  in  the  dav  of  need  they  could  profit  from  the  needs 
of  their  fellows.  AVe  shall  have  to  <^et  rid  of  this  idea  in  our  indi- 
vidual and  national  life  if  we  are  to  get  rid  of  the  most  prolific  source 
of  war  in  the  field  of  international  relations. 

Let  us  not  confuse  creative  industry  with  mere  shrewdness  or  fore- 
sight or  superior  mental  or  physical  capacity.  Superiority  of  this 
kind  should  have  no  reward  for  itself,  but  only  for  its  exercise  for 
the  benefit  of  others,  for  the  community  as  a  whole.  AVhen  it  con- 
fines itself  to  forecasting  the  future  and  seizing  now  those  tilings 
that  are  to  be  valuable  hereafter  it  has  no  real  claim  to  the  grati- 
tude or  the  respect  of  others.  It  has  added  nothing  to  the  wealth  or 
the  welfare  of  mankind.  It  may  be  difficult  to  draw  the  line,  but  it 
is  none  the  less  certain  that  there  is  a  line  of  distinction  between 
creative  and  predatory  wealth;  and  the  duty  of  the  community  is 
to  draw  the  line  as  rapidly  as  it  can  discern  where  it  really  lies  and 
to  approximate  it  even  when  its  exact  location  is  not  entirely  clear. 
It  is  the  business  of  the  community  to  protect  community  interests 
and  to  promote  community  welfare.  If  there  is  anything  clear  in 
our  philosophy  or  our  history  it  is  that  civilization  is  developing  in 
this  direction : 

With  thousand  shocks  that  come  and  go, 
With  agonies,  with  energies, 
With  overthrowings,  and  with  cries, 

And  undulations  to  and  fro. 

We  know  now  that  success  in  war  depends,  after  the  first  shock, 
on  social  and  industrial  solidarity  far  more  than  upon  the  number  of 
trained  soldiers  that  can  be  placed  in  the  field.  It  is  easier  to  enlist 
men  and  to  train  them  if  the  front  can  be  held  for  a  time — in  our 
case  if  the  first  invading  expedition  can  be  held  off  or  seriously  crip- 
pled— than  it  is  to  organize  the  national  economic  and  industrial 
forces  to  support  the  troops  if  they  are  to  be  successful  under  the 
conditions  of  modern  warfare.  In  his  annual  message  of  December 
7  President  Wilson  emphasized  our  duty  in  this  regard : 

While  we  speak  of  the  preparation  of  the  Nation  to  make  sure  of  her  security 
and  her  effective  power  we  must  not  fall  into  the  patent  error  of  supposing  that 
her  real  strength  comes  from  armaments  and  mere  safeguards  of  written  law. 
It  comes,  of  course,  from  her  people,  their  energy,  their  success  in  their  under- 
takings, their  free  opportunity  to  use  the  natural  resources  of  our  great  home- 
land and  of  the  lands  outside  our  continental  borders  which  look  to  us  tor  pro- 
tection, for  encouragement,  and  for  assistance  in  their  development,  from  the 
organization  and  freedom  and  vitality  of  our  economic  life. 

The  domestic  questions  which  engaged  the  attention  of  the  last  Congress  are 
more  vital  to  the  Nation  in  this  its  time  of  test  than  at  any  other  time.    We  can 


24  PEEPAEATIONS   FOE   PEACE. 

QOt  adequately  make  ready  for  any  trial  of  our  strengh  unless  we  wisely  and 
promptly  direct  the  force  of  our  laws  into  these  all-important  fields  of  domestic 
action. 

He  then  proceeds  to  select  one  pressing  economic  problem  to  which 
to  direct  particular  attention.    He  says : 

In  the  meantime  may  I  make  this  suggestion?  The  transportation  problem  is 
an  exceedingly  serious  and  pressing  one  in  this  country.  There  has  from  time 
to  time  of  late  been  reason  to  fear  that  our  railroads  would  not  much  longer  be 
able  to  cope  with  it  successfully  as  at  present  equipped  and  coordinated.  I 
suggest  that  it  would  be  wise  to  provide  for  a  commission  of  inquiry  to  ascer- 
tain by  a  thorough  canvass  of  the  whole  question  whether  our  laws  as  at  pres- 
ent framed  and  administered  are  as  serviceable  as  they  might  be  in  the  solu- 
tion of  the  problem.  It  is  obviously  a  problem  that  lies  at  the  very  foundation 
of  our  efficiency  as  a  people.  Such  an  inquiry  ought  to  draw  out  every  circum- 
stance and  opinion  worth  considering,  and  we  need  to  know  all  sides  of  the 
matter  if  we  mean  to  do  anything  in  the  field  of  Federal  legislation. 

The  issue  thus  raised  will  be  found  to  go  far  deeper  than  mere 
changes  in  "  the  process  of  regulation."  No  lesson  of  the  war  has 
been  more  clearly  taught  than  that  efficient  transportation  is  of  the 
very  essence  of  military  efficiency  and  strength.  It  is  equally  true, 
as  President  Wilson  says,  that  the  transportation  problem  in  peace 
"  lies  at  the  very  foundation  of  our  efficiency  as  a  people."  Our  pres- 
ent method  of  dealing  with  it  is  increasingly  unsatisfactory  to  the 
private  interests  involved,  and  it  is  not  satisfactory  to  the  public. 
We  have  secured  many  improvements  by  adopting  public  regulation, 
but  as  this  regulation  proceeds  it  becomes  more  and  more  apparent 
that  the  transportation  system  of  the  country  is  essentially  one  inter- 
related and  interdependent  whole.  There  may  always  be  a  rivalry 
in  economy  and  efficiency  of  service,  but  competition  for  traffic  is 
moderated  by  a  division  of  territory,  or  a  gentlemen's  agreement, 
while  competition  in  rates  has  almost  disappeared. 

Governmental  regulation  has  served  to  bring  out  clearly  the  essen- 
tially monopolistic  character  of  our  railroad  system  as  a  whole  and 
the  necessity  of  that  "coordination"  to  which  President  Wilson  re- 
fers. The  question  is  whether  coordination  in  the  public  service  can 
be  obtained  so  long  as  our  railroads  do  not  have  a  common  financial 
interest  as  among  themselves,  but  only  a  common  financial  interest 
as  against  the  public.  Can  a  public  service  which  is  essentially 
monopolistic  be  satisfactorily  performed  as  a  competitive  enter- 
prise? Are  we  not  losing  the  benefits  of  competition  without  obtain- 
ing the  advantages  of  regulated  monopoly?  We  are  certainly  irri- 
tating and  discouraging  private  enterprise  based  on  competitive 
profits.  So  unsatisfactorily  is  the  result  that  some  of  our  leading 
railroad  officials  regard  public  ownership  as  the  only  escape  from 
what  they  consider  destructive  regulation.  The  question  is  whether 
"coordination"  can  be  obtained  without  public  ownership. 

Germany  has  owned  and  operated  her  railroads,  from  the  point  of 
view  of  public  service,  in  peace  and  in  war,  not  from  the.  point  of 
view  of  profits,  although  the  profits  have  been  large.  The  probabili- 
ties seem  to  be  that  after  the  close  of  this  war  every  railroad  in 
Europe  will  he  nationalized.  Military  reasons  may  he  the  determin- 
ing factors  in  this  result,  but  it  may  well  lie  questioned  whether  any 
satisfactory  solution  of  the  transportation  problem  can  he  reached 
in  any  other  way.  Whether  our  government  should  take  over  our 
railroads  and  when  and  upon  what  conditions  may  raise  many  ques- 
tions of  expediency,  but  if  we  are  to  treat  the.  issue  with  open  mind 


PREPARATIONS   FOR   PEACE.  25 

it  is  important  that  we  should  understand  that  if,  in  tho  public 
interest,  the  government  should  do  so,  it  will  not  be  invading  the 
domain  of  private;  enterprise,  but  will  merely  be  taking  back  to  itself 
a  function  of  government  which,  for  what  seemed  sufficient  reasons 
of  expediency,  it  had  previously  delegated  to  private  agencies. 

I  take  it  we  shall  all  agree  that  if  there  is  something  which  it  is  the 
true  function  of  government  to  perform,  that  thing  will  never  be  per- 
formed as  it  should  be  until  the  government  performs  it.  We  may 
disagree  about  what  is  the  true  function  of  government,  but  once  it  is 
determined  that  on  principle  the  performance  of  a  particular  service 
is  a  function  of  government,  that  means,  if  it  means  anything,  that 
under  right  conditions  of  government  it  will  be  better  performed  by 
the  government  than  if  left  to  private  enterprise.  If  a  government  is 
not  performing  all  of  the  functions  of  government  it  is  to  that  extent 
a  failure  as  a  government.  The  results  must  continue  to  be  less  satis- 
factory and  less  eflicient  than  they  should  be  and  can  be  if  the  gov- 
ernment is  performing  all  of  its  functions,  is  qualified  to  perform 
them,  and  is  performing  them  properly.  Noav,  nothing  is  more 
clearly  settled  in  the  law  of  this  country  and  in  the  principles  upon 
which  that  law  is  based  than  that  railroads  as  common  carriers  are 
performing  a  function  of  government.  The  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States  and  many  other  courts  have  so  held.  (See  United 
States  v.  Joint  Tariff  Association,  171  U.  S.,  505,  570;  Talcott  v. 
Pine  Grove,  23  Federal  Cases,  G52,  etc.)  Indeed,  the  construction 
and  control  of  the  public  highway  is  historically  and  on  principle 
one  of  the  first  of  the  functions  of  government,  and  a  railroad  is  a 
public  highway.  My  purpose  in  discussing  this  matter  has  been  to 
indicate  how  deep  the  issues  of  industrial  mobilization  go.  In  Eng- 
land it  already  involves  the  relations  of  the  trade  unions  to  the 
government. 

It  is  insisted  by  some  that  the  abolition  of  war  or  even  its  sub- 
stantial diminution  is  an  idle  dream ;  that  we  may  be  reasonably  cer- 
tain that  for  one  reason  or  another  this  country  will  be  involved  in 
war  within  a  comparatively  short  time.  Very  well.  It  is  now  clear 
that  industrial  mobilization  is  as  essential  to  modern  war  as  is  mili- 
tary mobilization,  and  such  mobilization  can  not  be  effectively  made 
after  hostilities  occur  unless  the  government  already  has  the  powers 
and  is  exercising  the  activities  essential  to  effective  mobilization.  It 
is  even  more  difficult  to  agree  upon  the  principles  and  to  create  the 
machinery  for  industrial  mobilization  than  for  military  mobilization, 
and  lack  of  actual  experience  in  applying  the  principles  and  operat- 
ing the  machinery  may  be  disastrous  in  die  one  case  as  in  the  other. 
Do  the  prophets  of  war  propose  to  face  now  the  problems  of  eco- 
nomic and  industrial  mobilization?  If  they  do  it  will  be  necessary 
to  abandon  some  dogmatic  assumptions  which  have  heretofore 
formed  and  still  form  so  large  a  part  of  our  political  thinking. 

One  of  the  most  significant  things  in  the  development  of  all 
modern  thought  has  been  the  decline  in  the  acceptance  of  dogma. 
Outside  of  the  exact  sciences,  like  mathematics,  we  have  learned  to 
look  with  suspicion  and  distrust  on  dogmatic  statement  of  laws  or 
principles.  William  G.  Sumner  says:  "If  you  want  war,  nourish  a 
doctrine.  Doctrines  are  the  most  frightful  tyrants  to  which  men  ever 
are  subject,  because  doctrines  get  inside  of  a  man's  own  reason  and 
betray  him  against  himself."     Consciously  and  unconsciously,  the 


f  G  PREPARATIONS   TOR   PEACE. 

pragmatic  philosophy  is  succeeding  the  dogmatic  in  science  as  it  is 
in  theology.  Experiment  is  succeeding  assumption  as  the  sure 
foundation  of  human  progress.  In  no  field  is  this  so  important  as 
in  the  field  of  political  and  social  science — of  nothing  is  it  so  true  as 
of  government.  In  the  T_  nited  States  we  have  been  particularly  in 
danger  of  dogmatic  error  because  of  the  wide  acceptance  of  the 
proposition  that  that  government  is  best  which  governs  least,  a  dog- 
matic principle  as  vicious  and  unsound  as  the  opposite  dogma  upon 
which  socialism  is  based;  for  the  dogma  that  the  state  should  directly 
cover  the  whole  field  of  human  industry  is  equally  fallacious.  The 
truth,  as  usual,  lies  between.  Government  is  not  best  when  it  gov- 
erns least,  nor  is  it  best  when  it  governs  most.  Government  is  best 
when  it  is  doing  well  whatever  will  promote  the  welfare  of  the  com- 
munity most  if  done  by  the  community  than  if  left  to  be  done  by 
part  of  the  community.  And  yet,  progress  is  unquestionably  in  the 
direction  of  the  extension  of  governmental  activities  into  fields 
heretofore  left  to  private  enterprise,  and  we  must  be  open  minded 
toward  further  movement  in  that  direction.  Germany  is  strong  to- 
day in  war,  not  only  because  she  is  prepared  for  war,  but  because 
she  has  gone  further  than  other  nations  in  the  assumption  by  her 
government  of  those  social  and  industrial  responsibilities  which  gov- 
ernment should  assume  whenever  it  is  apparent  that,  by  so  doing, 
the  welfare  of  the  nation — the  greatest  good  to  the  greatest  number — ■ 
will  be  promoted.  She  has  not  accepted  socialism,  but  she  has  been 
hampered  by  no  dogma  that  the  state  must  govern  as  little  as  pos- 
sible. To  the  extent  to  which  she  has  accepted  and  acted  upon  the 
principle  that  it  is  the  true  function  of  government  to  do  whatever 
will  promote  the  interest  of  the  community  better  if  undertaken  by 
the  community  than  if  left  to  private  enterprise,  just  to  that  extent 
has  she  strengthened  herself  and  secured  the  grateful  loyalty  of  her 
people.  So  Ave,  too,  must  proceed,  if  we  would  prepare  for  the  con- 
structive uses  of  peace  that  grateful  recognition  of  the  value  of  the 
nation  to  its  people,  and  that  patriotic  support  of  the  people  for  the 
nation,  which  we  are  being  exhorted  to  prepare  for  the  destructive 
purposes  of  war. 

In  the  long  retrospect  we  shall  find  nothing  clearer  than  that  the 
evolution  of  government  is  steadily  toward  the  assumption  of  new 
functions  in  the  service  of  the  people.  Slowly  but  surely  the  move- 
ment has  steadily  gone  forward  in  this  direction,  and  always  over 
the  protests  of  those  who  have  insisted  that  each  advance  was  an 
unwarranted  invasion  of  the  field  of  private  enterprise,  of  the  rights 
and  liberties  of  the  individual. 

Even  the  collection  of  taxes  for  the  support  of  the  state  was  once 
farmed  out  to  those  who  found  in  it  an  opportunity  for  private  profit. 
The  practice  found  its  justification  in  the  claim  that  an  army  of 
tax  collectors  would  be  a  public  menace,  and  that  the  government 
could  not  possibly  collect  the  (axes  as  economically  and  efficiently  as 
private  individuals.  To-day  it  would  be  a  rare  individual  indeed 
who  would  conceive  that  it  is  not  the  function  of  the  state  directly 
to  collect  the  (axes  accessary  for  its  own  support. 

Time  will  not  permit  even  the  enumeration  of  other  functions  once 
supposed  to  be  peculiarly  private,  in  their  character,  but  which  are 
now  exercised  by  the  government  almost  as  a  matter  of  course.    It  is 


PREPARATIONS   FOR   PEACE.  27 

almost  axiomatic  that  the  government  shall  conduct  the  Post  Office, 
shall  Bupply  water,  and  shall  extinguish  fires.  All  of  these  things 
■were  once  regarded  as  peculiarly  sacred  to  private  enterprise.  I  once 
represented  a  client  who  owned  and  operated  as  a  private  profit- 
making  enterprise  the  sewer  system  of  a  thriving  middle  western 
town  which  was  prevented  by  financial  limitations  in  its  charter  from 
performing  this  primary  municipal  function.  In  rending  Ferrero  I 
was  amused  and  instructed  by  his  account  of  the  sources  of  the  wealth 
and  political  power  of  Crassus  in  69  B.  C.    Ferrero  says: 

Since  the  houses  at  Rome  were  mostly  built  of  wood,  and  the  iEdilea  had  so 
far  failed  to  organize  efficient  measures  of  prevention,  fires  were  al  this  time 
exceedingly  frequent.  This  suggested  to  him  a  very  ingenious  idea.  He  organ- 
ized a  regular  fire  brigade  from  amongst  ins  slaves,  and  established  watch 
stations  in  every  part  of  Koine  As  soon  as  a  fire  broke  out  the  watch  ran  to 
give  notice  to  the  brigade.  The  firemen  turned  out,  but  accompanied  by  a 
representative  of  Crassus.  who  bought  np,  practically  for  nothing,  the  house 
which  was  on  fire,  and  sometimes  all  the  neighboring  houses  which  happened 
to  be  threatened  as  well.  The  bargain  once  concluded,  he  had  the  fire  put  out 
and  the  house  rebuilt.  In  this  way  he  secured  possession  of  a  large  number  of 
houses  at  a  trifling  cost,  and  became  one  of  the  largest  landlords  at  Rome,  both 
in  houses  and  land,  which  he  was  then  able,  of  course,  to  exchange,  to  sell,  and  to 
buy  up  again  almost  as  he  chose.  Having  become  in  this  way  one  of  the  richest, 
if  not  the  richest  man  in  Rome,  his  power  steadily  increasing  with  every  rise 
in  the  price  of  money,  Crassus  soon  became  a  dominating  figure  in  the  Senate 
and  the  electorate,  and  indeed  among  all  classes  of  the  community. 

Indeed,  when  later,  an  axlilc  who  sprang  from  the  common  people 
extended  the  function  of  government  in  Rome  to  include  the  oper- 
ation of  a  tire  brigade,  his  activities  were  very  much  resented,  and 
the  privileged  classes  found  it  difficult  to  explain  and  impossible  to 
justify  his  popularity  with  the  people.  I  have  no  doubt  that  Rome 
rang  with  the  same  arguments  about  the  invasion  of  the  field  of 
private  enterprise  with  which  the  public  ownership  of  railroads  and 
other  public  utilities  is  received  in  this  country  to-day. 

I  am  far  from  suggesting  that  in  any  given  community,  at  any 
given  time,  it  would  be  axiomatic,  or  even  expedient,  for  the  govern- 
ment to  undertake  all  or  any  of  these  enterprises.  I  am  merely  assert- 
ing that  it  is  by  no  means  true  that  it  should  not  do  so  solely  because 
it  would  conflict  with  some  dogmatic  conception  of  the  state.  It  is  a 
question  of  wise  expediency  under  existing  conditions  in  every  case, 
remembering  always  that  the  inexorable  law  of  social  evolution  is 
moving  steadily  toward  the  assumption  of  community  functions  by 
the  community. 

The  argument  that  the  government  has  been  too  weak,  too  ineffi- 
cient, or  too  corrupt  to  be  trusted  with  functions  which  might  be 
performed  by  a  better  government  is  only  a  confession  of  the  indict- 
ment against  our  government  and  us.  It  is  quite  true  that,  in  deter- 
mining the  ultimate  interests  of  the  community  we  must  look  for 
the  long  result.  We  must  not  destroy  the  incentives  that  are  essen- 
tial to  progress.  The  whole  fabric  of  existing  civilization  is  based 
upon  the  institution  of  private  property',  upon  the  conception  that 
in  the  existing  stage  of  human  development  the  best  and  most  effec- 
tive way  in  which  to  advance  the  well-being  of  mankind  is  by  an 
appeal  to  the  self-interest  or  the  necessities  of  individuals;  but  even 
if  we  are  entirely  sure  that  necessity  and  financial  gain  arc  the  most 
effective  incentives  to  industrj'-  for  the  mass  of  mankind,  are  we  not 


28  PREPARATIONS   FOR   PEACE. 

all  coming  to  see  that  there  is  a  point  at  which  we  overload  the  lure? 
Once  we  rise  above  the  pinch  of  poverty  and  attain  physical  comfort 
and  intellectual  opportunity,  are  there  not  other  incentives  besides 
money  that  will  stimulate  and  attract  the  very  highest  talent  and  the 
very  greatest  industry?  Is  not  this  demonstrated  by  the  financial 
sacrifices  made  b}T  so  many  of  the  very  best  men  in  our  public  service? 
You  know  what  the  desires,  the  hopes,  the  aspirations  that  ani- 
mate you.  What  is  it  that  you  think  would  prove  most  satisfying 
and  would  call  out  the  best  there  is  in  you?  Is  it  not  the  conscious 
and  effective  use  of  your  faculties  for  the  accomplishment  of  things 
which  you  think  are  worth  while?  Is  not  the  basis  of  real  happiness 
obscured  by  false  standards  of  success?  There  are  dangers  in  democ- 
racy, just  as  there  are  dangers  in  privilege,  but  mankind  has  defi- 
nitely discarded  the  old  ideal  of  aristocracy.  The  purpose  of  civi- 
lization is  not  to  produce  an  efflorescence,  but  to  elevate  the  mass. 
The  aristocracy  of  the  future  is  to  be  an  aristocracy  of  service,  not 
of  privilege:  of  achievement,  not  of  acquisition. 

The  very  first  and  most  essential  of  all  our  preparation  must  be 
to  make  our  government — local,  state,  and  national — what  it  should 
be.  This  is  the  service  for  which  we  need  universal  training  and  a 
patriotism  that  is  nobler  and  more  useful  than  all  the  patriotism  of 
war. 

It  is  suggested  that  we  already  respond  to  the  civic  appeal  more 
easily  than  to  the  appeal  for  military  sacrifice,  but  Hiram  Maxim 
says. 

I  wonder  why  if  is  that  we  are  not  as  enthusiastic  in  this  social  service  work 
as  we  are  in  attacking  the  problem  of  war.  is  it  that  there  is  more  glory  and 
more  that  appeals  to  the  martial  imagination  in  attacking  war  and  warriors 
than  there  is  in  the  prosaic,  tame,  and  glamorless  enterprise  of  simply  saving 
human  life  in  peaceful  pursuits  for  the  mere  sake  of  saving  it? 

Senator  Root  has  recently  made  an  eloquent  appeal  for  military 
preparation,  in  which  he  said : 

-   Do  not  let  •  •  ourselves.    Adequate  preparation  for  the  preservation 

of  our  liberty  means  a  vast  expenditure,  but  it  means  more  than  that;  it  means 
a  willingness  Cor  self-sacrifice,  a  spirit  among  our  people,  the  length  and  breadth 
of  the  land,  among  the  rich  and  the  poor,  among  the  highly  educated  and  the 
graduates  of  the  common  school,  among  professional  men,  merchants  and 
bankers,  farmers  and  laborers — a  national  spirit  among  the  people  of  the  land, 
and  a  determination  to  preserve  the  liberty  and  justice  of  the  American  Repub- 
lic and  to  make  a  sacrifice  of  means  and  convenience,  comfort,  and,  if  need  he, 
of  life,  in  the  cause. 

To  every  word  of  this  we  should  subscribe.  But  I  wish  the 
Si  riator  bad  gone  on  to  demonstrate — as  he  could  do  so  well — that 
the  patriotism  and  self-sacrifices  of  peace  are  of  more  transcendent 
importance,  even  as  a  preparation  for  war,  than  any  present  reso- 
lution of  willingness  to  sacrifice  ''means  and  convenience,  comfort, 
and.  if  need  be,  of  life,"  upon  the  field  of  battle.  1  am  not  detract- 
ing in  the  leasi  from  the  importance  of  making  defensive  military 
preparations;  but  a  determination  to  preserve  the  liberty  and  justice 
of  the  American  Republic,  and  to  make  some  sacrifice  of  means  and 
convenience  and  comfort  in  the  piping  times  of  peace  will  be  our  best 
preparation  for  war  and  our  most  likely  insurance  against  it. 

Ho  not  lei  iis  deceive  ourselves.  The  United  Stales  of  America, 
as  a  nation,  is  worth  preserving,  is  entitled  to  our  loyalty  and  de- 
votion, only  to  the  extent  that  it  is  an  agency  to  promote  the  moral, 


PREPARATIONS   FOR   PEACE.  29 

intellectual,  and  physical  well-being  of  its  people,  not  some  of  its 
people,  but  all  of  its  people — only  to  the  extent  that,  in  very  truth, 
in  the  realities  of  the  everyday  life  of  the  men,  the  women,  mid  the 
children  who  inhabit  it,  its  conscious  ideal  is  the  greatest  good  to  the 
greatest  number.  To  carry  out  that  ideal  means  a  vast  expenditure, 
willingly  and  intelligently  made;  it  means  a  preparedness  for  self- 
sacrifice  in  times  of  peace  quite  as  much  as  in  times  of  war — nay,  a 
greater  self-sacrifice,  because  the  progress  of  civilization  is  measured 
by  the  extent  to  which  peace  supersedes  and  supplants  war.  It  means 
a  spirit  among  our  people  the  length  and  breadth  of  the  land,  among 
the  rich  and  the  poor,  among  the  highly  educated  and  the  graduates 
of  the  common  school  and  those  to  whom  fortune  unhappily  has  given 
no  schooling  at  all,  among  professional  men,  merchants  and  bankers, 
farmers  ami  laborers — a  national  spirit  determined  to  make  the 
American  Republic  an  agency  of  liberty  and  justice  at  home  and 
abroad. 

In  the  service  of  this  ideal,  lot  us  destroy  every  special  privilege 
and  be  prepared  to  sacrifice  means  and  convenience  and  comfort  and, 
if  need  be,  life  itself  to  protect  that  government  and  the  people  it 
governs  against  every  assault  by  force  or  cunning,  whether  from 
within  or  from  without.  Let  us  make  social  justice  and  social 
service  our  national  ideal;  and  to  this  end  let  us  control  and  develop 
our  national  resources  in  times  of  peace,  not  only  that  they  may  be 
mobilized  in  time  of  war,  but  because  a  government  which  is  per- 
forming this  sort  of  service  to  its  people  will  be  thus  most  effectively 
organized  for  peace.  By  all  means,  let  us  have  an  army  and  a  navy 
adequate  for  the  defense  of  such  a  nation,  but  let  us  realize  that  far 
more  imporant  than  armies  and  navies  are  our  national  purposes 
and  policies. 

Are  we  really  without  the  desire  and  the  hope  that  the  United 
States  may  acquire  exceptional  advantages  in  the  commercial  devel- 
opment of  other  countries — let  us  say,  in  this  hemisphere  or  parts  of 
it,  in  Cuba  and  the  West  Indies,  in  Mexico  and  Central  America? 
Are  we  entirely  free  from  the  subconscious  thought  that  here  is  our 
sphere  of  influence?  How  far  is  this  thought  at  the  bottom  of  the 
modern  development  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  especially  as  conceived 
by  Secretary  Olney  when  he  declared  that  "the  United  States  is 
practically  sovereign  on  this  continent "?  Is  it  because  of  its  hoped- 
for  economic  advantages  to  us  that  we  insist  upon  a  doctrine  which 
seems  no  longer  to  have  any  political  justification?  Certainly  we 
are  no  longer  in  apprehension  that  our  republican  form  of  govern- 
ment would  seriously  be  jeopardized  if  any  European  nation  should 
acquire  political  dominion  over,  or  should  plant  its  colonies  in,  South 
America.  Those  countries  repudiate  and  resent  our  assumption  of  a 
benevolent  protectorate  over  their  national  interests.  They  look 
with  suspicion  upon  all  our  declarations  of  disinterestedness  and 
point  to  our  dealings  with  Mexico  in  the  acquisition  of  Texas  and 
California  and  to  other  incidents  in  our  history  as  proof  of  the  justice 
of  their  fears.  Even  the  declaration  of  President  Wilson,  that  this 
country  will  never  again  seek  to  acquire  a  foot  of  territory  by  force 
of  arms,  is  regarded  merely  as  the  expression  of  a  personal  opinion, 
or  as  in  the  same  class  with  the  diplomatic  assurance  of  pacific  inten- 
tion which  has  usually  preceded  the  extension  of  the  British  or  the 
French  or  the  German  or  the  Italian  domains. 


30  PBEPABATIONS   FOB   PEACE. 

Tliere  is  a  clearer  mutual  understanding  and  a  closer  community 
of  political  and  commercial  interest  between  the  principal  countries 
of  South  America  and  the  great  nations  of  Europe  than  between 
those  countries  and  ourselves.  The  ties  of  race  and  language  and 
religion  are  closer.  Few  of  our  people  understand  how  the  eastward 
trend  of  the  southern  portion  of  this  hemisphere  brings  South 
America  into  as  close  or  closer  proximity  to  Europe  than  to  the 
United  States,  especially  when  available  trade  routes  are  taken  into 
consideration.  South  American  development  has  been  financed  in 
Europe,  not  in  the  United  States,  and  to  attempt  to  expand  our  com- 
merce in  that  direction  without  assuming  the  large  financial  obliga- 
tions that  are  essential  to  it  is  merely  to  work  against  the  natural 
laws  of  trade. 

Pan  Americanism  exalts  physical  geography,  which  is  important; 
but  commercial,  intellectual,  and  racial  geography  is  more  important. 
Pan  Americanism  must  be  based  on  and  be  measured  by  real  mutu- 
ality of  interest  and  obligation.  We  should  recognize  and  strengthen 
our  mutual  interests  with  Latin  America,  but  we  should  not  forget 
other  equally  or  more  important  interests  in  Canada  or  Europe. 
The  preservation  of  existing  political  geography  to  the  south  of  us 
against  change  by  violence  should  tend  to  increase  stability  where 
this  is  especially  desirable;  but  why  should  we  insist  that  the  Amer- 
icas are  a  separate  international  unit  over  which  the  United  States  is 
to  maintain  a  benevolent  protectorate  at  its  own  risk  and  without 
control  over  their  domestic  conditions  or  foreign  policies? 

To  assert  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  essential  to  our  national 
safety  has  become  an  absurdity.  Monarchical  institutions  no  longer 
threaten  our  Republic.  We  have  lived  to  see  a  republican  form  of 
government  firmly  established  in  France  and  to  see  constitutional 
monarchy  develop  steadily  toward  the  essentials  of  representative 
democracy.  We  have  lived  for  more  than  a  century  in  immediate  con- 
tact with' a  great  self-governing  colony  of  England,  with  the  result 
that  we  have  influenced  its  institutions  far  more  than  it  has  influ- 
enced ours.  The  whole  purpose  of  President  Monroe's  famous  dec- 
laration and  the  whole  justification  for  making  it  have  undergone 
a  transformation  so  complete  thai  nothing  but  the  lack  of  intelligent 
discussion  of  the  question  can  explain  the  extent  to  which  it  is 
regarded  as  something  as  holy  as  the  Ark-  of  the  Covenant  by  so 
many  of  the  American  people. 

It' is  salt'  to  say  that  we  believe  in  something  called  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  because  we  do  not  understand  it  and  are  making  no  attempt 
whatever  to  define  it  or  to  appraise  its  value  to  ns.  Let  us  not  con- 
fuse it  with  that  doctrine  which  is  practically  recognized  by  all  the 
great  nations  of  the  world,  viz,  thai  wherever  a  nation  is  in  fact  so 
situated  that  the  acquisition  or  control  of  immediately  adjacent 
countries  by  great  and  powerful  rival-  would  jeopardize  its  peace 
and  security,  that  nation,  in  the  exercise  of  its  right  of  self-defense, 
can  justly  insisi  upon,  its  rival  refraining  from  such  an  extension  of 
its  domain.  The  point  is  well  illustrated  by  the  declaration  of  Paul 
Rohrbach  with  reference  to  the  possible  absorption  of  Holland  by 
(iei  many.  He  saj  :  "The  resulting  disturbance  of  the  political 
equilibrium  in  Europe  would  be  -<>  distinctly  in  favor  of  Germany 
thai  all  the  other  States  would  be  justified  in  rising  in  protest  against 
it."'     The  right  of  a  nation  to  protect  its  vital  interests  has  been  uni- 


PREPARATIONS   FOR   PEACE.  31 

versally  recognized,  subject  always  to  the  possible  exercise  of  superior 
force  to  override  the  objection.  No  nation  has  questioned  the  right 
of  another  nation  to  assert  its  vital  interests,  although  it  may  have 
questioned  its  power  to  maintain  them.  The  issue  is  an  issue  of  fact. 
Does  the  particular  thing  which  is  threatened  jeopardize  the  vital 
interests  of  the  protesting  nation? 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  has  never  been  accepted  by  other  nations  as 
sound  in  principle,  although  the  acquiescence  of  Great  Britain  has 
prevented  it  from  being  challenged;  but  if  we  were  frankly  to  assert 
that  the  acquisition  of  Mexico  by  a  European  nation  would  be  re- 
garded as  an  unfriendly  act  because  it  threatened  the  vital  interests 
of  the  United  States  it  is  exceedingly  unlikely  that  there  would  be 
any  attempt  to  deny  that  we  were  justified  in  interfering.  Whether 
we  should  assert  such  an  interest  in  the  future  of  Mexico  would  de- 
pend upon  the  question  of  fact  as  to  its  influence  upon  our  national 
security.  Whether  our  interest  would  be  admitted  would  depend 
upon  the  question  of  fact  as  to  the  effect  of  the  proposed  action  upon 
the  vital  interests  of  this  nation.  It  might  depend  upon  our  military 
ability  to  sustain  our  position;  but  what  I  am  trying  to  make  clear 
is  that  the  validity  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  depends  upon  principles 
of  universal  international  application  and  not  upon  principles 
peculiar  to  us  or  to  the  American  continents. 

In  the  interests  of  national  security  we  should  ourselves  confine 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  to  these  limits.  In  its  present  vague  form  it  is 
a  menace  to  our  peace  and  to  the  peace  of  the  world — all  the  more 
dangerous  because  we  have  not  now,  and  we  do  not  propose  to  have, 
military  force  sufficient  to  maintain  it  if  it  should  be  seriously  ques- 
tioned. Nothing  is  so  dangerous  to  peace  as  the  assertion  of  a  right 
which  is  offensive  to  others,  which  they  believe  to  be  unjustified,  and 
which  we  are  not,  and  do  not  expect  to  be,  prepared  to  defend.  It 
is  in  support  of  the  broader  Monroe  Doctrine  and  incidentally  to  get 
the  support  of  the  Pacific  Coast  that  the  Navy  League  is  insisting 
that  we  should  have  a  navy  on  the  Pacific  stronger  than  Japan's 
and  another  navy  on  the  Atlantic  stronger  than  the  navy  of  any  other 
nation  except  England — a  policy  which,  fortunately,  there  seems  to 
be  no  probability  whatever  of  the  United  States  being  persuaded  to 
adopt.  And  yet,  if  we  do  net  have  such  a  navy,  I  must  agree  with 
Homer  Lea  when  he  says  that  "  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  if  not  supported 
by  naval  and  mility  power  sufficient  to  enforce  its  observance  by  all 
nations  singly  and  in  coalition,  becomes  a  factor  more  provocative 
of  war  than  any  other  national  policy  ever  attempted  in  modern  or 
ancient  times." 

Our  greatest  duty,  therefore,  is  not  to  build  fleets  to  maintain  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  but  it  is  to  consider  whether  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
in  any  ether  sense  than  the  protection  of  our  vital  national  interests, 
is  worth  the  risk  of  war  and  the  cost  of  preparing  for  it.  It  it  can 
not  be  justified  upon  the  ground  of  defense,  can  it  be  justified  upon 
the  ground  of  self-interest?  The  Monroe  Doctrine  may  have  helped 
drive  Maximilian  out  of  Mexico.  It  may  have  served  us  in  some 
indeterminate  directions  during  the  first  half  of  our  national  exist- 
ence, but  if  it  has  profited  us  in  any  other  way  the  evidence  does  not 
seem  to  be  available.  Certainly  we  can  show  no  financial  profit  and 
no  prospect  in  this  direction. 


32  PREPARATIONS    FOR   PEACE. 

It  may  not  be  clear  that  our  trade  in  Latin  America  would  have 
been  substantially  greater  if  it  had  been  colonized  by  European  na- 
tmns  and  developed  under  their  flags,  but  it  certainly  is  not  clear  that 
this  would  not  have  been  the  case.  Our  total  trade  with  South 
America  for  the  vear  ending  June  30,  1913  (unaffected  by  war), 
was  a  little  over  '$300,000,000.  Our  trade  with  Canada  the  same 
year  was  over  $535,000,000.  Approximately  $162,000,000  of  our 
South  American  trade  was  with  Brazil  alone,  the  greater  portion 
being  imports  of  coffee,  which  we  may  safely  assume  would  have 
sought  a  market  in  this  country  no  matter  under  what  flag  the  coffee 
had  been  raised.  It  seems  equally  true  that  our  sales  of  agricultural 
implements  to  South  America  would  doubtless  have  been  as  great  if 
the  flag  of  England  or  Germany  or  France  or  Italy  or  Spain  had 
been  flying  in  the  southern  portion  of  the  hemisphere. 

I  am  net  regretting  the  political  independence  of  the  South  Ameri- 
can republics.  On  the  contrary,  I  share  in  the  feeling  of  pride  in 
their  achievements,  which  is  perhaps  not  justified  by  our  contribution 
to  that  result.  I  am  merely  pointing  out  that  the  further  assertion 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  would  seem  to  have  no  justification  in  the 
commercial  results  obtained  by  it;  and  the  extension  of  our  trade 
in  the  future  will  depend  upon  considerations  with  which  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  has  nothing  whatever  to  do.  But  even  if  it  were  true  that 
its  abandonment  would  result  in  some  diminution  of  our  commerce, 
which  I  do  not  believe,  the  loss  would  be  utterly  insignificant  in  com- 
parison with  the  expenditure  we  shall  have  to  make  if  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  is  to  be  anything  but  a  source  of  weakness  and  of  danger. 

There  is  a  widespread  popular  impression  that  Germany  has  ulte- 
rior designs  on  South  America,  and  that,  if  successful  in  the  present 
war,  she  will  restrict  the  trade  of  other  nations  and  discriminate 
against  this  country.  I  find  no  justification  for  this  opinion.  I  have 
no  doubt  that  Germany  resents  and  disagrees  with  the  doctrine  of 
Monroe.  I  have  no  doubt  that,  whether  successful  or  unsuccessful  in 
the  war,  she  will  seek  to  push  her  trade  and  commerce  in  South 
America.  But  all  of  the  indications  are  that  Germany  has  been  look- 
ing to  the  Near  and  Middle  East  as  the  field  peculiarly  adapted  for 
her  political  and  commercial  expansion.  It  is  the  Bagdad  Railroad 
and  the  ancient  Babylonian  empire  upon  which  she  seems  to  have 
fixed  her  desires,  and  with  respect  to  which  she  so  bitterly  resents 
the  restrictions  tor  which  she  holds  England  responsible.  There  is 
much  misunderstanding  about  German  colonization  in  South 
America.  It  is  estimated  that  the  total  German  immigration  now  in 
Argentina,  for  instance,  is  only  30.000,  while  there  are  950,000 
Kalians  and  150.000  French.1  I  have  been  unable  to  obtain  the  total 
figures  for  Brazil,  but  in  1910  the  immigration  was  30,857  Portu- 
.  20,8  13  Spanish,  14,163  Italians,  3,902  ( rermans,  etc. 

I  shall  refer  to  only  one  other  matter  of  this  character,  and  that  is 
our  relations  with  Japan;  and  I  select  them  because  we  are  supposed 
by  many  to  be  in  greater  danger  of  a  collision  with  Japan  than  with 
any  other  nat  ion,  unless  it  be  Germany.  It  is  said  that  Japan  is  likely 
to  attack  us,  because  we  oiler  an  enticing  opportunity  for  loot,  because 

»The  official  Immigration  figures  In  Argentina  for  the  period  from  1S57  to  iao8  arc  as 
follows : 

Italian  1,799.423:  Spanish.  795.243;  French,  188.316;  English,  42,765:  Aiistro-Ilun- 
garlan,  59,800;  German,  40.655;  Swiss,  28344;  Belgian,  20,<j(J8 ;  other,  203,212.  The 
emigration  was  a  little  lesw  than  half  the  immigration. 


PREPARATIONS   FOR   PEACE.  33 

Japan  wishes  to  acquire  the  Philippines,  and  because  she  wishes  to 
force  us  to  accept  her  people  as  immigrants  and  to  treat  them  on  a 
parity  with  the  immigrants  from  other  countries. 

I  think  we  may  dismiss,  ss  unworthy  of  our  own  intelligence,  the 
suggestion  that  Japan  would  make  a  wanton  attack  upon  this  country 
merely  in  the  hope  of  exacting  an  indemnity  or  of  pilaging  our 
Pacific  coast.  Japan  has  done  nothing  that  would  justify  the  assump- 
tion that  she  would  be  influenced  by  such  a  motive,  even  if  she  could 
be  persuaded  that  she  would  succeed.  No  nation  in  the  history  of  the 
world  has  so  clearly  earned  the  right  to  have  its  motives,  its  intelli- 
gence, and  its  achievements  treated  with  respect  than  has  Japan. 
Her  ambition  is  clearly  to  secure  the  respect  of  the  civilized  world 
and  to  deserve  it.  In  my  judgment  she  will  be  more  punctilious  in 
respect  to  international  morals  than  many  nations  that  boast  a 
broader  civilization.  But  if  nothing  else  would  restrain  her  she  is 
too  intelligent  not  to  know  that  all  she  could  secure  in  the  way  of 
pecuniary  advantage  would  have  to  be  returned  manyfold  in  the 
competition  of  armaments  that  would  inevitably  ensue,  until  this 
country  had  made  her  atone  for  every  wrong  that  she  had  done  to 
us.  The  day  of  the  international  marauder  on  any  such  scale  as  this 
is  over. 

The  Open  Door  in  China  is  one  of  the  issues  which  are  thought  to 
be  provocative  of  trouble  with  Japan.  Hiram  Maxim  says  a  Japa- 
nese diplomat  asked  him  by  what  logic  we  can  proclaim  America 
for  the  Americans  and  disclaim  Japan's  right  equally  to  proclaim 
Asia  for  the  Asiatics.  What  is  the  answer?  Baron  Shibusawa  re- 
cently said  in  1113^  hearing  that  Japan  was  especially  desirous  of 
cordial  relations  with  the  United  States  for  three  reasons:  First,  be- 
cause Japan  recognized  many  obligations  of  gratitude  to  the  United 
States  for  our  conspicuous  part  in  the  acceptance  and  development  of 
modern  conditions  and  institutions  by  Japan;  secondly,  because  one- 
fourth  of  Japan's  foreign  commerce  was  with  the  United  States,  and 
Japan  was  anxious  to  retain  and  increase  it;  thirdly,  because  the 
greatest  world  problem  was  the  adjustment  and  mutual  understand- 
ing of  oriental  and  occidental  civilization,  and  that  Japan  believed 
the  two  nations  best  adapted  to  bring  this  about  were  Japan  and  the 
United  States  working  sympathetically  together  for  this  purpose. 
Such  speeches  may  be  only  international  compliments,  but  they  de- 
serve thoughtful  consideration. 

As  to  the  Philippines,  there  is  no  evidence  that  Japan  desires  them 
at  this  time,  when  her  hands  are  full  to  overflowing  with  opportuni- 
ties in  Korea  and  China.  And  what  is  our  policy  in  the  Philippines? 
Do  we  really  intend  to  establish  there  an  independent  nation?  Do 
we  propose  to  retain  control  over  its  international  policies  after  we 
have  given  it  independence?  If  Ave  do  not  control,  do  we  none  the 
less  propose  to  protect  the  Philippine  nation  against  the  consequences 
of  its  own  policies  or  to  guarantee  its  sovereignty  or  territorial  in- 
tegrity? If  we  seek  to  retain  no  special  advantages  over  other 
nations  in  the  commercial  development  of  the  Philippine  Islands  and 
are  animated  by  sincerely  benevolent  motives,  should  we  not  seek  to 
secure  international  guaranties  that  would  be  far  more  effective  than 
anything  that  we  alone  can  do  to  assure  independence  of  the  nation 


34  PBEPAEATIONS   FOE    PEACE. 

for  whose  existence  we  are  to  be  responsible?  Is  it  at  all  clear  that 
Japan  Avould  not  gladly  join  in  such  an  arrangement? 

The  remaining  source  of  future  trouble  with  Japan  is  the  policy 
which  we  adopt  toward  her  with  respect  to  immigration  and  the 
rights  of  her  people  while  residing  in  this  country.  There  can  be  no 
question  that  Japan  resents  the  manner  in  which  her  people  are  being 
treated  on  the  Pacific  coast.  Whether  California  is  justified  or  not 
in  the  substance  of  what  she  seeks  by  restricting  the  rights  of  the 
Japanese  to  acquire  and  hold  land  is  entirely  outside  the  point.  The 
citizens  of  the  United  States  are  under  restriction  with  respect  to 
land  ownership  in  Japan,  and  this  subject  is  susceptible  of  diplomatic 
adjustment  on  a  basis  that  will  recognize  the  mutual  self-respect  of 
both  countries.  Japan  has  given  evidence  ot  the  most  substantial 
character  of  her  desire  to  meet  and  treat  this  issue  in  a  broad-minded 
and  practical  wa}'.  She  asks  merely  that  it  shall  be  so  treated.  If 
we  treat  her  thus,  and  have  California  treat  her  thus,  we  shall  do 
more  to  reduce  the  probability  of  friction  with  Japan  than  all  the 
naval  and  military  preparations  we  shall  make  against  her. 

It  is  said,  however,  that  we  must  enormously  increase  our  Navy 
if  we  are  to  protect  our  interests  in  the  Panama  Canal.  Before  the 
Canal  was  constructed  the  argument  ran  quite  the  other  way.  The 
construction  of  the  Canal  was  so  to  facilitate  the  passage  of  our  fleet 
from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Pacific,  or  the  reverse,  that  it  would  double 
the  efficiency  of  the  fleet,  and  constitute  an  ^sstt  of  incalculable  value 
in  the  event  of  war.  Now,  hovever,  it  has  become  merely  an  exten- 
sion of  our  coast  line,  a  vulnerable  point  which  it  is  essential  to  take 
extraordinary  precautions  t^  protect.  If  this  is  true,  we  have  gained 
oiny  a  military  liability  by  the  construction  of  the  Canal,  having 
admitted  the  merchant  vessels  of  all  nations  to  the  Canal  on  a  parity 
with  our  cwn.  Proximity  to  the  Canal  is  our  onl}7  advantage  over 
ether  nations  so  far  as  our  foreign  commerce  is  concerned.  If  it 
is  to  take  a  huge  navy  to  protect  it  so  that  it  may  be  used  for  the 
passage  of  our  fleets  in  time  of  war,  there  would  seem  to  have  been 
little  net  gain  from  a  military  point  of  view.  Should  we  not  be  far 
better  oh1'  if.  having  made  this  splendid  contribution  to  the  commerce 
of  the  world,  we  should  now  completely  neutralize  the  Canal,  under 
international  guaranties,  in  which  we  should  invite  all  civilized 
nations  to  join?  The  basis  of  the  agreement  might  be  either  the 
closing  of  the  Canal  to  the  warships  of  belligerent  nations,  or  the 
opening  of  the  Canal  to  all  belligerents  alike,  upon  the  condition  that 
n«*  encounter  should  be  permitted  to  take  place  within  a  specified 
distance  from  either  entrance.  The  practicability  of  this  plan  would 
necessarily  depend  upon  the  extent  to  which  the  Can..l  could  be 
secured  from  injury  or  a  surprise  nttack  from  some  belligerent  who 
did  not  respect  its  obligations.  Either  plan  would  probably  result 
in  greater  protection  of  our  interests  in  the  Canal  than  any  security 
derived  from  the  size  <>f  the  fleet  available  for  its  defense  in  the  event 
of  war  between  the  United  States  and  any  first-class  naval  power. 

But  the  necessity  <d'  naval  protection  i'<>r  the  Canal  must  be  con- 
sidered in  the  light  of  (Jen.  Goethals's  testimony  before  the  sub- 
committee of  tin-  Committee  on  Appropriations  of  the  House  of 
Representatives.  Gen.  Goethals  testified  that  on  the  assumption 
that  the  naval  contest  had  been  ended,  and  that  the  control  of  the 
sea  rested  with  the  enemy,  so  that  the  enemy's  transports  were  free 


PREPARATIONS    FOR    PEACE.  35 

and  able  to  land  troops,  a  force  of  25,000  men  with  proper  land  de- 
fenses would  be  able  to  hold  off  an  invading  expedition  against  the 
Panama  Canal  at  least  as  long  as  the  time  that  was  necessary  for  the 
capture  of  Port  Arthur.  If  this  be  true,  it  would  seem  clear  that 
the  defense  of  the  Panama  Canal  would  necessitate  no  departure 
from  the  defensive  naval  policy  in  which  the  submarine  would 
largely  replace  the  dreadnaught  and*  the  battle  cruiser.  The  Canal 
is  perouliarly  adapted  for  defense  by  submarines,  and  there  is  a  dif- 
ference of  expert  opinion  as  to  whether  its  land  defenses  should  not 
be  confined  to  defense  against  raids. 

It  will  naturally  be  said  that  even  if  we  abandon  the  policy  of  ex- 
tending our  commercial  interests  by  force  or  by  the  show  of  force 
other  nations  will  not  do  so,  and  unless  we  are  prepared  to  assert  our 
rights  in  foreign  lands  our  financial  interests  will  suffer,  our  pride 
be  humbled,  and  our  people  be  humiliated  and  abused.  There  are 
cases  in  which  we  must  be  prepared  to  send  warships  into  foreign 
seas  to  enforce  respect  for  the  flag  of  the  United  States  and  for 
those  who  are  entitled  to  its  protection.  The  policies  I  am  suggest- 
ing would  never  leave  this  country  without  a  Navy  containing  suffi- 
cient warships  to  compel  the  respect  of  or  to  punish  those  inferior 
nations  from  which  we  need  have  any  apprehension  of  wanton  in- 
sult or  ill  treatment  of  our  nationals.  No  civilized  nation  of  conse- 
quence would  in  time  of  peace  refuse  atonement  for  insult  or  injury 
to  any  of  our  people.  We  may  conclusively  assume  that  every  repa- 
ration would  be  made,  and  every  precaution  would  be  taken  against 
the  repetition  of  such  an  incident.  Nothing  but  the  willingness  of 
the  offending  nation  to  proceed  to  war  would  call  for  a  larger  Navy 
than  we  should  have;  and  our  naval  policies  in  the  event  of  war 
would  depend  upon,  and  be  determined  by,  the  larger  considerations 
to  which  I  have  referred.  Assuming  that  we  were  protected  at  home 
against  invasion,  we  might  effectively  resort  to  other  weapons  than 
the  use  of  force.  There  are  some  conceptions  of  national  honor  and 
of  what  is  essential  for  its  vindication  that  are  reminiscent  of  the 
code  duello;  but  they  can  not  long  survive  that  discredited  institution. 

To  the  contention  that  we  must  have  a  navy  adequate  to  protect 
our  foreign  trade  and  keep  open  the  highways  of  commerce,  it  seems 
sufficient  to  reply  that  unless  we  develop  a  real  merchant  marine  our 
foreign  commerce  would  be  carried  on  neutral  ships ;  that  no  blockade 
of  our  extensive  coasts  could  be  made  effective;  and  that  nothing  but 
the  dominion  of  the  seas  could  give  us  an  assurance  of  uninterrupted 
foreign  trade  if  private  commerce  is  not  to  be  safe  under  the  sanctions 
of  international  law.     General  Greene  has  aptly  said : 

We  do  not  need  and  will  not  have  in  this  country  an  army  of  seven  hundred 
thousand  men,  as  some  ill-halanced  enthusiasts  demand;  we  are  not  compelled 
to  and  we  will  not  enter  the  battleship  race  of  England  and  Germany.  England 
must  run  this  race  or  die.  We  are  not  so  situated,  and  it  would  be  supreme 
folly  for  us  to  waste  our  resources  or  our  thoughts  on  any  such  contest. 

But  a  defensive  military  policy  does  not  assume  a  policy  of  inter- 
national isolation.  If  there  is  anything  which  this  war  and  the 
issues  arising  out  of  this  war  have  made  clear,  it  is  that  no  nation 
can  longer  live  unto  itself,  and  least  of  all  that  a  great  commercial 
nation  like  the  United  States  can  refrain  from  active  and  direct  par- 
ticipation in  the  determination  of  those  policies  and  the  creation  of 
those  agencies  by  which  law  is  to  be  substituted  for  war  and  the 


36  PREPARATIONS   FOR   PEACE. 

peaceful  development  of  the  world  is  to  be  assured.  The  peaceful 
development  of  the  United  States  is  indissolubly  linked  with  the 
peaceful  development  of  Europe  and  the  world.  We  can  no  longer 
refrain  from  alliances  because  they  may  involve  us  in  issues  from 
which,  thus  far,  we  have  happily  been  free.  We  must  take  our  place 
in  the  family  of  nations  and  assume  our  full  measure  of  responsibil- 
ity. Nor  need  we  despair  of  making  substantial  progress  toward 
the  substitution  of  peaceful  means  for  the  settlement  of  international 
differences  by  force  of  arms. 

The  declaration  of  President  Wilson  with  regard  to  Pan  Amer- 
icanism in  his  annual  message  should  serve  the  useful  purpose  of 
directing  public  attention  to  the  inapplicability  of  the  old  conceptions 
of  the  Monroe  doctrine  to  existing  conditions.  If  this  nation  is  really 
definitely  to  abandon  the  role  "  which  it  was  always  difficult  to  main- 
tain without  offense  to  the  pride  of  the  peoples  whose  freedom  of 
action  we  sought  to  protect,  and  without  provoking  serious  miscon- 
ceptions of  our  motives,"  and  is  to  interpret  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as 
an  invitation  to  "  a  full  and  honorable  association,  as  of  partners, 
between  ourselves  and  our  neighbors,  in  the  interest  of  all  America, 
north  and  south,"  it  marks  a  tremendous  forward  step  in  the  national 
policies  of  the  United  States.  It  must  not  be  forgotten,  however, 
that  the  invitation  has  not  yet  been  accepted,  and,  above  all,  that  it 
has  not  yet  been  embodied  in  any  international  undertakings  that  can 
be  regarded  as  a  substitute  for  the  doctrine  of  Monroe. 

The  President's  message  is  admirable  so  far  as  it  gees,  but  it  leaves 
unanswered  the  question  as  to  what  this  country  would  propose  to 
do  in  any  of  the  contingencies  to  which  I  have  referred.  Are  we  to 
have  a  defensive  alliance  with  the  Latin-American  nations,  and  if  so, 
upon  what  mutual  terms  and  conditions?  Can  we,  and  shall  we, 
make  a  real  start  toward  "the  parliament  of  man,  the  federation  of 
the  world,"  by  a  Pan  American  alliance  in  the  interests  of  peace? 
Undoubtedly  there  never  was  an  opportunity  so  favorable  as  this; 
and  why  should  we  not  press  heme  our  opportunity  by  inaugurating 
that  League  to  Enforce  Peace,  which  is  the  most  practical  of  all  the 
suggestions  that  have  thus  far  been  made  for  the  substitution  of  law 
for  war  by  international  agreement? 

I  trust  that  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  the  United  States  will 
seize  the  opportunity  which  is  peculiarly  within  its  grasp.  Never,  it 
seems  to  me,  was  anything  more  timely  than  the  referendum  which  is 
now  being  taken  by  that  great  national  association  of  the  business 
interests  of  America.  I  think  it  is  safe  to  assume  that  few,  indeed, 
in  this  audience  are  aware  of  an  event  which  is  almost  epochal  in 
its  importance. 

On  the  2d  day  of  September,  1015,  a  Special  Committee  of  the 
Chamber  of  Crmmerce  of  the  United  States  of  America,  composed  of 
men  of  large  business  experience,  representing  commercial  institu- 
tions of  the  highest  and  most  conservative  standing,  unanimously 
recommended  that  Cemrre.ss  and  the  President  be  called  upon  to  do 
all  in  their  power  to  prom<  te  the  establishment  of: 

1.  A  more  comprehensive  and  better-defined  sea  law. 

2.  An  International  Court 

3.  A  Council  'if  Conciliation, 

4.  International  Conferences  for  the  better  establishment  and  progressive 
amendment  of  International  Law. 


PREPARATIONS    FOR    PEACE.  37 

S.  The  organization  of  a  System  of  Commercial  and  Financial  Non-Inter- 
course, to  be  followed  by  military  force,  If  necessary,  to  be  applied  to  those 
nations  entering  Into  the  foregoing  arrangements  and  thou  going  to  war  with- 
out first  submitting  their  differences  to  an  agreed-upon  tribunal.1 

The  first  four  of  these  recommendations  are  regarded  as  based 
upon  considerations  so  convincing  that  the  committee  appointed  to 
formulate  arguments  against  the  recommendations  involved,  so 
that  all  phases  of  the  question  should  be  presented  on  the  taking  of 
the  referendum,  said: 

It  is  assumed  that  the  first  four  proposals  of  the  committee  are  directed  to 
conditions  so  well  understood  that  the  agreement  about  the  answers  to  them 
is  so  nearly  universal  as  to  render  unnecessary  any  attempt  to  formulate  ob- 
jections to  them. 

As  to  the  fifth  proposal,  the  committee  which  is  in  charge  of  the 
referendum  vote  states  that  it  involves  the  adoption  of  a  new  prin- 
ciple "which,  however  moderate  in  its  immediate  form,  may  be  re- 
garded as  a  departure  from  accepted  rules  of  conduct  in  international 
law"  ;  and  it  sets  forth  a  number  of  objections,  which  it  says  "may 
be  deserving  of  attention." 

All  of  these  objections,  however,  were  met  in  advance  in  the 
unanimous  report  of  the  special  comm'ttee.  Having  already  pointed 
out  that  "the  problem  of  securing  peace  and  justice  among  nations 
is  simply  an  extension  of  what  we  have  successfully  solved  in  the 
national  and  municipal  realms,"  and  that  international  conferences 
have  already  secured  results  of  the  greatest  importance  for  the  peace 
and  progress  of  the  world,  the  committee  expresses  the  opinion  that — 

Tins  movement  toward  international  agreement  and  law  was  gaining  In 
strength  each  year.  Stopped  by  the  war,  there  is  little  doubt  that  it  will  re- 
vive stronger,  and  pursue  its  course  in  a  more  regular  and  systematic  way 
when  the  war  is  over.  Business  men  perhaps  more  than  others  should  be  anx- 
ious to  support  such  endeavors  for  a  better  understanding  among  nations, 
establishing  more  firmly  enlightened  standards  to  govern  their  Interrelations 
and  furnishing  a  more  elaborate  and  organic  body  of  international  public  and 
administrative  law.  The  present  war  has  again  incontrovertibly  shown  the 
fundamental  need  for  this.  The  problem  is,  then,  not  new  or  novel,  but  needs 
only  to  be  broadened  and  organized  to  yield  all  the  desired  benefits.  *  *  * 
There  is  a  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  employment  of  force  to  compel  any 
signatory  nation  to  submit  its  cause  to  an  international  tribunal  before  going 
to  war.  Your  Committee,  however,  believes  that  the  great  majority  of  the 
practical  men  of  the  United  States  who  hold  themselves  responsible  for  reason- 
able progress  see  the  necessity  of  the  employment  of  an  adequate  pressure  or 
force  to  compel  signatory  nations  to  bring  their  cause  before  an  International 
Court  or  Council  of  Conciliation  before  going  to  war;  because  however  desir- 
able it  may  be,  theoretically,  not  to  use  force,  yet  the  history  of  the  last  100 
years,  the  many  wars  during  that  time,  and  the  events  of  the  present  war  have 
made  apparent  the  fundamental  need  of  an  international  power  to  enforce 
the  submission  of  international  disputes  to  a  court.  The  alternative  is  con- 
stantly recurring  wars,  and,  in  the  interval  between  these  wars,  the  increasing 
absorption  in  preparation  for  war  of  the  resources  of  the  principal  nations  of 
the  world. 

The  committee  demonstrates  the  wisdom  and  the  practicability  of 
the  use  of  economic  pressure  as  a  preliminary  to  the  use  of  force,  and 
point  out  that,  while  such  pressure  involves  economic  loss  to  the 

lTlie  preliminary  count  of  the  votes  of  the  constituent  members  of  the  national  chamber 
on  this  referendum,  announced  on  January  5.  1910.  showed  the  following  results  :  Propo- 
sition 1  :  763  in  favor.  29  opposed:  proposition  2:  75:}  in  favor,  2  1  opposced ;  proposition 
3:  744  in  favor,  28  opposed;  proposition  4:  709  in  favor,  13  opposed;  proposition  5(a)  : 
550  in  favor,  157  opposed  (economic  pressure)  ;  proposition  5(b)  :  452  in  favor  249 
opposed    (military   force). 


451645 


38  PREPARATIONS   FOR    PEACE. 

nations  that  apply  it,  "  war.  too,  is  costly  and  self-injurious  to  the 
nations  which  essay  it." 

Your  Committee  has  studied  sympathetically  the  arguments  of  those  who,  on 
principle,  oppose  all  force,  even  to  enforce  law  instead  of  war;  likewise,  the 
argument  of  those  who  respect  the  tradition  that  the  United  States  should 
"  keep  free  of  entangling  alliances."  It  muse  be  conceded  that  the  latter  de- 
scribed a  past  policy  under  which  our  nation  has  grown  in  prosperity  and  hap- 
piness. But  your  Committee  is  forced  to  see  that  our  country  is  already  di- 
rectly involved  in  the  present  war,  because  the  lives  and  prosperity  of  Ameri- 
can citizens  have  been  involved,  and  because  the  fiuure  peace  and  prosperity 
of  our  country  will  be  involved  in  the  settlement  of  the  war. 

Your  Committee  believes  that  American  citizens,  realizing  the  world's  Im- 
perative need  of  the  substitution  of  law  for  war,  if  militarism  is  not  to  dominate, 
are  ready,  nay,  feel  it  the  clear  call  of  duty,  to  take  their  share  of  the  work 
and  responsibility  necessary  to  establish  this  substitution.  We  can  not  escape 
if  we  would,  we  would  not  if  we  could;  the  call  of  women  and  children,  of 
the  helpless  and  the  weak,  suffering  indescribably  from  needless  war,  is  an 
irresistible  compulsion  to  all  Americans,  and,  not  least,  to  American  business 
men.     *     *     * 

Knowing  that  civilization  is  made  up  of  the  work  and  suffering  and  martyr- 
doms of  the  past,  we  are  willing,  yes,  anxious,  to  "pay  back,"  in  kind  if  neces- 
sary, what  we  are  enjoying,  if  thereby  we  can  help  on  this  greatest  forward 
step  of  civilization — the  substitution  of  law  for  war.  Your  Committee  believes 
that  the  time  is  ripe,  as  never  before,  for  the  fundamental  advance  in  civiliza- 
tion that  the  establishing  of  an  International  Court  and  Council  represents. 
*  *  *  Your  Committee  believes  that  it  is  practically  possible  that  the  time 
has  arrived,  if  the  United  States  will  but  do  its  share  of  the  work.  There  is 
little  real  hope  for  success  if  the  United  States  is  not  a  part  of  it.  *  *  * 
If,  at  the  close  of  the  war  there  exists  the  legalized  purpose  of  the  United  States 
to  join  in  the  work  needed  too  enforce  peace,  there  will  be  a  most  practical 
reason  to  expect  success  for  this  so  necessary  step  forward.  In  fact,  the  begin- 
ning of  the  necessary  organization  may  be  in  existence  at  that  time,  by  ieason 
of  the  agreement  between  the  United  States  and  some  of  the  neutral  nations 
of  South  America  and  Europe.  It  is  a  great  opportunity,  perhnps  the  greatest 
that  has  ever  come  to  any  nation.  It  is  a  great  adventure  practically  within 
our  power  to  promote — an  enterprise  that  appeals  to  all  that  is  best  in  us — an 
opportunity  we  will  not  miss. 

Kemember  these  are  not  the  words  and  this  is  not  the  action  of  a 
body  of  visionary  enthusiasts;  it  is  the  unanimous  recommendation 
of  a  special  committee  of  the  greatest  commercial  body  in  this  coun- 
try, appointed  "  to  examine  into  the  relations  between  the  present 
war  and  business,  and  submit  suggestions  as  to  the  future."  Nor  is 
it  the  only  indication  of  the  progress  of  higher  ideals  in  international 
relations. 

There  is  a  dispatch  which  was  sent  by  Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir 
Edward  Goshen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  at  the  very  crisis  of 
the  diplomatic  interchanges  which  preceded  the  war,  which  I  have 
read  and  reread  with  mingled  feelings  of  sadness  and  hope.  It  has 
always  seemed  to  me  the  most  tragic  of  all  the  official  documents 
which  have  been  published  by  the  warring  nations,  and,  at  the  same 
time,  the  most  encouraging.  Just  as  it  seemed  inevitable  that  the 
explosion  would  occur,  that  the  catastrophe  must  happen,  after  the 
suggestions  and  eountersuggestions,  the  complaints  and  countercom- 
plaints  had  been  discussed  under  the  forms  and  usages  of  diplomacy, 
Sir  Edward  Grey  struck  a  new  note  that  went  straight  to  the  heart 
of  the  underlying  cause  of  all  the  difficulty.  On  July  30,  1914,  he 
authorized  Sir  Edward  Goshen  to  say  to  the  German  Chancellor: 

If  the  peace  <»f  Europe  can  be  preserved  and  the  present  crisis  safely  passed, 

my  own  endeavor  will  be  to  promote  some  arrangement,  to  which  Germany  could 
!..:  ;i  party,  by  which  she  could  be  assured  that  no  aggressive  or  hostile  policy 


PREPARATIONS   FOR    PEACE.  39 

would  be  pursued  against  her  or  her  allies,  by  Franco,  Russia,  and  ourselves, 
jointly  or  separately.  I  have  desired  this  and  worked  for  it.  as  far  as  I  could, 
through  the  hist  Balkan  crisis,  and  Germany  having  a  corresponding  object, 
our  relations  sensibly  Improved.  The  idea  has  hitherto  been  too  Utopian  1o 
form  the  subject  of  definite  proposals;  but  If  this  present  crisis,  so  much  more 
acute  than  any  that  Europe  has  gone  through  for  generations,  be  safely  passed, 
I  am  hopeful  that  the  relief  and  reaction  which  will  follow  may  make  possible 
some  more  definite  rapprochement  between  the  powers  than  has  been  possible 
hitherto. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  did  not  indicate  exactly  what  he  had  in  mind, 
but  with  the  fate  of  Europe  trembling  in  the  balance,  Utopia  seemed 
nearer  and  more  practically  available  than  had  seemed  possible  lie- 
fore.  It  was  to  be  "  some  more  definite  rapprochement  between  the 
powers  than  has  been  possible  hitherto" — some  arrangement  to  which 
Germany  could  be  a  party,  by  which  she  could  be  assured  that  no 
aggressive  or  hostile  policy  would  be  pursued  against  her  or  her  allies 
"by  France.  Russia,  and  ourselves,  jointly  or  separately."  Oh.  the 
pity  that  Utopia  had  not  seemed  nearer  a  little  while  before;  that 
this  dispatch  should  have  waited  for  "  this  present  crisis,  so  much 
more  acute  than  any  that  Europe  has  gone  through  for  generations." 
What  a  tragedy  that  it  should  have  been  received  by  a  chancellor 
who  heard  it  without  comment  "because  His  Excellency  was  so 
taken  up  with  the  news  of  the  Russian  measures  along  the  frontier." 

That  dispatch  has  not  yet  been  answered.  The  German  Chancellor 
asked  for  and  received  a  copy  as  a  memorandum,  as  "he  would  like 
to  reflect  on  it  before  giving  an  answer."  He  has  had  much  time  and 
much  occasion  to  reflect.  That  dispatch  will  be  unanswered  at  the 
close  of  the  war.  The  future  of  mankind  depends  upon  the  spirit  in 
which  its  discussion  is  resumed,  and  upon  the  conditions  which  then 
exist.  After  this  present  conflict,  so  much  more  destructive  and 
appalling  than  any  that  Europe  has  gone  through,  why  should  not 
the  United  States  hold  open  a  road  that  will  at  least  lead  toward. 
Utopia  by  adopting  the  suggestions  on  which  the  members  of  the 
national  Chamber  of  Commerce  are  now  voting — by  having  in  ex- 
istence the  beginning  of  a  League  to  Enforce  Peace  by  agreements 
then  already  made  between  the  United  States  and  some  of  the  neutral 
nations  of  South  America  and  Europe?  Si  vis  pacem  para  pacem. 
If  we  wish  peace  let  us  prepare  for  peace. 

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